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STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. LLOYD L. GAINES,
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vs.
S. W. CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF MISSOURI, AND THE CURATORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, RESPONDENTS.

REFE,RENCE TO OPINION BELOW.
The opinion below (not yet officially reported) appears in 113 S. W. (2d) 783, and at pages 210-224 of the
record.

STATE,MENT OF THE CASE.
·T his case is pending upon a petition for certiorari
to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri,
affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Boone
·C ounty, Missouri, denying a writ of mandamus. Petitioner sought mandamus to compel respondents, the
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Registra r and Board of Curators of the Universi ty of
Missouri , to admit petitione r, a negro, as a student in
the School of Law in the Universi ty of Missouri . The
Supreme Court of Missouri held that responde nts had
properly denied petitione r's applicati on for admissio n
(a) because the laws of Missouri provide for separatio n
of the races for the purpose of higher educatio n, and do
not entitle a negro to admissio n as a student in the
Universi ty of Missouri ; and (b) because by the Lincoln
Universi ty Act (Secs. 9616-9624, R. S. Mo., 1929) the
state had provided for petitione r an opportun ity to receive a legal educatio n which is equal to that provided
for white students in the Universi ty of Missouri , and
therefore petitione r's rights under the equal protectio n
clause of the Fourteen th Amendm ent were not infringed
(R. 210-224) . ·
In his petition and supporti ng brief petitione r omits
material facts, erroneou sly states other facts, and in
several instances makes half true statemen ts which convey a misleadi ng impressi on of the evidence . We therefore deem it necessar y to submit our own statemen t of
the case.
Petitione r, a young man now 27 years of age, a
native of Mississip pi, came to Missouri in 1926 and received his educatio n in free public schools maintain ed
by Missouri for the educatio n of negroes, including
educatio n in common school, high school and in Lincoln
U11iversity, a state universi ty for negroes. He was
graduate d from the latter institutio n in August, 1935,
with an A.B. degree (R. 210, 57, 78-79). He thereupo n
made applicati on for admissio n as a student in the school
of law in the Universi ty of Missouri (R. 210, 63), and
later filed with its registrar a transcrip t of his credits as ·
a ~tudent in Lincoln Universi ty (R. 60-61, 64). Peti-.
tioner's commun ication with the registrar was entirely by
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correspondence, and until he filed the transcript of his
credits from Lincoln University there was nothing in the
correspondence to apprise the registrar that petitioner
was a negro (R. 60).
Upon the filing of the transcript from Lincoln
University it became obvious to the registrar that petitioner must be a negro. Thereupon the registrar telegraphed petitioner s11ggesting that he communicate with
President Florence of Lincoln University regarding arrangements for his legal education (R. 65). President
Florence then wrote petitioner calling his attention specifically to the provisions of the Lincoln University Act of
1921, and offering petitioner aid thereunder (R. 72-73).
This act provides higher education for negroes equal
to that furnished to white students in the University
of Missouri (Sec. 9618, R. S. Mo., 1929), and provides
that pending the full development of Lincoln University
the Lincoln University board of curators shall arrange
for the attendance of any negro resident of Missouri at
the university of any adjacent state, to ~ake any course
of study which is provided in the University of Missouri
but which is not taught at Lincoln University; and requires the Lincoln University curators to pay the tuition
fees for such temporary out-of-state attendance (Sec.
9622, R. S. Mo., 1929).
Petitioner admits that he was thus fully advised of
the provisions made for his benefit by the Lincoln
University Act of 1921, and that he fully understood his
rights under that statute. He says that after full consideration he deliberately refused to avail himself of
such rights (R. 74, 82, 83, 84). He testifies that within
two days after he received President Florence's letter
calling his attention to his right to receive a legal education through Lincoln University, he got in communication with the National Association for the Advancement
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of Colored People (R. 82), and discussed his rights with
the counsel for that association (R. 84), who advised him
to refuse to avail himself of the rights provided for him
by the Lincoln University Act, and to "keep on corresponding with Missouri University" (R. 84).
In a deposition taken before trial petitioner was
asked whether, if a good law school were established at
Lincoln University on a par with the one at the University of Missouri, he would attend it; and on the advice of counsel petitioner refused to answer this question (R. 88-89).
Petitioner admitted that he had refused to avail himself of any of the rights provided for him by the Lincoln
University Act (R. 85-86), and had never made application to Lincoln University for education in the law,
either in a school of law to be established in that institution, or, pending that, in a law school in the state university of any one of the four adjacent states which admit
negroes as students (R. 218, 219, 85-86, 136-137).
The law schools in the state universities in each of these
states (Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and
four adjacent
.
Illinois) admit nonresident negroes as students (R. 8788); and petitioner is eligible, from a scholastic standpoint and otherwise, to become a student in any one of
these . four schools (R. 219, 90-91).
If he had seen fit to accept the opportunity open to
him, he would have had the right to call upon the Lincoln
University curators for an education in the law; and it
would have then become the mandatory duty of the
Lincoln University curators (Lincoln University v. Hackmann, 295 Mo. 118, 124) to establish a school of law in
Lincoln University up to the standard of the law school
in the University of Missouri (Sec. 9618, R. S. Mo., 1929);
and, pending that, to arrange for petitioner's attendance
at the school of law in any of the four adjacent state
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universities which petitioner might select, and to pay
petitioner's tuition fees therein (Sec. 9622, R. S. Mo.,
1929).
The petitioner's expense of travel to these adjacent
state universities would have been no greater than the
traveling expense of students living in various parts of
Missouri, who attend the University of Missouri at
Columbia (R. 219-220, 90, 151-153); and he would necessarily have had to pay living expenses, regardless of
which university he attended (R. 220) .·
During the time that petitioner might temporarily attend an adjacent state university, pending the
establishment of a school of law in Lincoln University,
the Lincoln University curators would be required by
the statute to pay the full amount of his tuition fees
(Sec. 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929). These tuition fees for
the first year of the law course range from $109.75
to $178.00 in the four schools (R. 220, 157-8, 159-160,
161, 162). White students attending the school of law
in the University of Missouri must pay · their own tuition fees, which for the first year. amount to $127.50
(R. 220, 154-155), and they receive no reimbursement
from the state. Petitioner would, therefore, · temporarily
enjoy a pecuniary advantage over white students of
law attending the University of Missouri, pending the
establishment of a school of law in Lincoln University.
The law schools in the universities of the adjacent
States of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois are each
schools of high standing, members of the Association
of American Law Schools, and on the approved list of
the American Bar Association (R. 219, 113). Petitioner's evidence shows without dispute that a student
desiring to practice law in Missouri can get as sound,
comprehensive ·and valuable legal education in any one
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of these four adjac ent law schoo ls as he could get in
the Univ ersity of Misso uri Law Schoo l (R. 219, 117118). In each of these four adjac ent lavv schools, and
in the law schoo l of the Univ ersity of Misso uri, the
syste m of educa tion is exact ly the same ; and the aim
and purpo se of the schoo ls, as of all mode rn law
schoo ls, is to give the stude nt such funda ment al educa tion in the law as will serve as a basis for the practice of law in any state wher e the Anglo -Ame rican
syste m of law obtai ns (R. 219, 109). In all of these
schoo ls in adjac ent states the caseb ook syste m of instruc tion is used (R. 109, 113); and the cours es of
study and the caseb ooks used are subst antia lly identical with those in the Univ ersity of Misso uri Law
Schoo l (R. 219, 155-157, 158-159, 160, 161, 162-163). It
frequ ently happe ns that law stude nts trans fer from one
to anoth er of these five law schoo ls (in Misso uri, Kansas, Nebra ska, Iowa and Illino is Univ ersiti es); and
the cours es of study and the quali ty of instru ction in
the five schoo ls are so nearl y ident ical that the stude nt
loses no time when he transf ers, receiv es full credi t
for the work done in his forme r schoo l, and moves.
right along witho ut any hiatu s or loss of stride (R.
219, 114).
In the trial court the petiti oner allege d that the
schoo l of law in the Univ ersity of Misso uri specia lizes
in Misso uri law and proce dure, and that in no other·
schoo l could he study Misso uri law and proce dure to
the same exten t and on an equal level of schol arship
and inten sity (R. 16). The evide nce fails to susta in
this allega tion, and concl usive ly dispr oves it. The Universi ty of Misso uri Law Schoo l does not specia lize in
Misso uri law and proce dure (R. 219, 99, 100). The,
schoo l is in no sense a provi ncial law schoo l adapt ed
mere ly to educa te lawye rs for pract ice in Misso uri only
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(R. 109). The school teaches the general common-law
system as practiced throughout the United States (R.
109). The aim is to lay a thorough ge11eral foundation
for t11e practice of law in any jurisdiction where the
Anglo-Ameri can system of jurisprudence obtains (R.
219, 109, 118). The casebooks used in the school are
used generally in law schools over the country, including Columbia, Northwestern , Harvard (R. 116),
Kansas University, Nebraska University, Iowa University
and Illinois University (R. 109). Tl1e casebooks do
not contain a disproportion ately high number of Missouri cases, there being 6,966 cases in all of the casebooks used in the three-year law course, of which only
97 or 1.2 per cent are Missouri cases (R. 219, 111-113).
In the courses taught at the University of Missouri
Law School there is no more instruction on Missouri
law than would be given a student at tl1e Harvard
University Law School (R. 116). Of 3,284 applicants
for admission to the bar in Missouri in the five-year
period, 1931 to 1935, only 246 applicants studied law
at the University of Missouri L•a w School (R. 144-145).
Some of the best lawyers in Missouri are graduates
of law schools in other states (R. 117). Upon tl1e foregoing evidence, all of which is a part of petitioner's
proof and is undisputed, the Missouri Supreme Court
found against petitioner upon his contention that the
University of Missouri Law School specializes in Missouri law and procedure ( R. 219) .
There has never been any demand upon Lincoln
University by any negro for a legal education (R. 222,
136, 137). Consequently , no school of law has, up to this
time, been established in Lincoln University (R. 77).
However, prior to the institution of this suit, the Lincoln
University curators were making a complete survey of
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the whole subjec t of negro educat ion in Missou ri, to determin e what Lincol n Univer sity should do for the negro
people of the state which it was not alread y doin'g; and
on the basis of this survey were planni ng a definit e program of expans ion (R. 130).
A law school in Lincol n Univer sity could be established and operat ed for a small class, on a level of scholar ship and trainin g equal to that in the Univer sity of Missouri Law School , for a maxim um of $10,000.00 per year
(R. 185-18 6). The library of the Suprem e Court of Missouri, one of the most comple te law librari es in the state,
and a better one than that at the Univer sity of Missou ri
Law School , is located a few blocks from Lincol n University , and is open to the public both day and night (R.
145, 193). A studen t in a small class would receive more
intensi ve trainin g than a studen t would receive in a class
of 30 to 50 studen ts, and would practic ally have the advantag e of a private tutor (R. 186). If petitio ner were
admitt ed as a studen t in the Univer sity of Missou ri Law
School , and were taught in a separa te class from the
white studen ts in accord ance with the public policy and
traditi on of the state, the expens e to the state would be
as great as it would be to establi sh a law school in Lincoln Univer sity (R. 186).
Petitio ner's own eviden ce shows that the State of
Missou ri is a pionee r among the states in the field of
higher educat ion for negroe s, and is the only state in
the Union which has establi shed a separa te univer sity for
negroe s on the same basis as the state univer sity for
white studen ts (R. 138). Dr. J. D. Elliff testifie d that
during the five years of his incum bency as chairm an of
the board of curato rs of Lincol n Univer sity, the Genera l
Assem bly has always given Lincol n Univer sity substa ntialiy all the money reques ted by its board for .mainte nance, operati on, · expans ion and genera l purpos es (Rec.
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137). From 1921 to 1935, inclusive, the state has appropriated to Lincoln University $3,477,153.49 (Laws Mo.,
1921, pages 65, 87, 101; Laws Mo., 1923, pages 51, 60, 96;
Laws Mo., 1925, pages 57, 78; Laws Mo., 1927, page 88; .
Laws Mo., 1929, pages 24, 101; Laws Mo., 1931, page 46;
Lavvs Mo., 1933, pages 124, 130; Laws Mo., 1935, page 66).
From this total, $500,000.00 was eliminated by the decision in Lincoln, U,iiversity v. Hackmann, 295 Mo. 118, so
the net balance appropriated in these years was $2,977,153.49 (R. 149-150). These appropriations included hundreds of thousands of dollars available for the salaries
of professors and instrt1ctors generally, as well as for
general expenses-thus providing ample funds for the
establishment of any professional or graduate courses for
which any need might arise (see Appropriation Acts
copied in Appendix).
'l,he unexpended balances in the Lincoln University
funds were $311,061.74 on August 9, 1935, the date when
petitioner was graduated from Lincoln University and
was ready to begin his legal education (R. 8); $298,620.16
on September 6, 1935, the date when the University of
Missouri and Lincoln University respectively began their
fall semesters; and $159,870.73 on April 17, 1936, when
this suit was filed (R. 147).
Supplementing the appropriations to Lincoln University above referred to, the General Assembly in the
years 1929 to 1935, inclusive, appropriated additional sums
aggregating $55,615.91 as funds available for payment of
out-of-state tuition fees (Laws Mo., 1929, page 61; Laws
Mo., 1931, page 28; Laws Mo., 1933, pages 9, 87; Laws
Mo., 1935, page 113). This special fund is administered
by the state superintendent of schools (R. 165-169) who
is ex officio a member of the Lincoln University board of
curators (Sec. 9617, R. S. Mo., 1929). In this special
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tuition fund the unexpended balance on August 9, 1935,
and September 6, 1935, was $6,351.18, and on April 17,
1936, was $2,214.98 (R. 220-221, 165).
While petitioner's counsel in their brief speak disparagingly of Lincoln University, the petitioner himself,
who received his academic education there, admits that
Lincoln University is a well-manage d, well-conduct ed university, on a plane with the University of Missouri as far
as he knows (R. 79-80, 80-81). The record shows that the
value of Lincoln University's land, buildings and equipment has grown from $362,000.00 in 1930 to $868,854.00 in
1936 (R. 138).
No negro has ever attended or been received as a
student in the University of Missouri; no negro except
petitioner has ever applied for admission as a student;
and it has always been the public policy of the state to
provide separate educational systems for negroes and
whites (R. 169-170, 171-172, 174-184).
Petitioner admits that he understood it to be the
public policy, law and Constitution of Missouri to separate
negro and white children for the purposes of education
(R. 81). He admits he knew that Lincoln University was
established for negroes and the University of Missouri was
established for whites (R. 81); yet with this knowledge
he nevertheless made application for enrollment as a student in the University of Missouri (R. 82).
The curators of the University of Missouri rejected
petitioner's application upon grounds stated in the following resolution, copy of which was by the registrar furnished to petitioner (R. 210, 70-71):
'•

"Whereas, Lloyd L. Gaines, colored, has applied
for admission to the School of Law of the University
of Missouri, and
"Whereas, the people of Missouri, both in the
Constitution and in the Statutes of the State, have.

'

.
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provided for the separate edu~cation of white students
and negro students, and have thereby in effect forbidden the attendance of a white student in Lincoln
University, or a colored student at the University of
Missouri, and
"Whereas, the Legislature of the State of Missouri, in response to the demands of the citizens of
Missouri, has established at Jefferson City, Missouri,
for negroes, a modern and efficient school known as
Lincoln University, and has invested the Board of
Curators of that institution with full power and authority to establish such d.epartments as may be necessary to offer to stud.ents of that institution opportunities equal to those offered at the University, and
have further provided, pending the full development
of Lincoln University, for the payment, out of the
public treasury, of the tuition, at universities in adjacent states, of colored students desiring to take any
course of study not being taught at Lincoln University,
and
"Whereas, it is the opinion of the Board of
Curators that any change in the State system of
separate instruction which has been heretofore established, would react to the detriment of both Lincoln
University and the University of Missouri,
"Therefore, be it resolved, that the application
of said Lloyd L. Gaines, be and it hereby is rejected
and denied, and that the Registrar and the Committee on entrance be instructed accordingly."
Senator F. M. McDavid, president of the respondent
board of curators, testified that in rejecting petitioner's
application the board of curators acted from no other
motive or reason than a desire to obey what it conceived
to be the mandate of the constitution, the law and the
public policy of the state, requiring separation of the
races for the purpose of education (R. 175-176); that the
board as such has never had any policy on this subject,

.1 2
and never had any occasion to formulate any policy until
petitioner attempted to gain admission; and that when
for the first time in the history of the institution a negro
(petitioner) applied for admission, the board acted on
what it conceived to be its duty under the law (R. 176).
Senator McDavid further testified that the admission
of negroes into the University of Missouri would create
a great amount of trouble, and would make dis~ipline
very difficult; that every student and every citizen knows
the traditions of this state and of the university, running
through nearly a hundred years, respecting this matter;
and that to admit a negro into the University of Missot1ri
would be subversive of discipline, which is a matter of
very great importance; and that this feature also was
taken into consideration by the board in ruling on petitioner's application (R. 177).
From the circuit court's judgment denying mandamt1s
(R. 53-54) petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of
Missouri (R. 55), which latter court, in an opinion concurred in by all its seven judges, affirmed the judgment
(R. 209-224).
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SUMMA RY OF THE ARGUMENT.

I.
This case does not present a substanti al federal question reviewab le by this court.
The state court held that the laws of Missouri do not
entitle petitione r to be admitted as a student in the
Universi ty of Missouri , and held that those laws provide
for race separatio n for purposes of higher education (R.
211-216). This construc tion of the laws of Missouri is
binding here.
Senn v .. Tile Layers' Protectiv e Union, 301 U. S.
468, 477.
Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power &
Light Co., 300 U. S. 109, 113.
Atchison , Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Railroad
Commiss ion of California, 283 U. S. 380,
390-1.
-C oombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434, 441.
Memphis & C. Ry. Co. v. Pace, 282 U. S. 241, 244.
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 480.
Roe v. State of Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U. S.
191, 193.
Ex Parte Worceste r County National Bank, 279
U. S. 347, 359.
Brinkerh off-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,
281 U. S. 673, 680.
Hanover Fire Insuranc e Co. v. Carr, 272 U. S.
494, 509.
Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 308.
Swiss Oil Corporat ion v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407,
411-412.
State of Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271
U. S. 40, 41.
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Keith v. Johnson, 271 U. S. 1, 8.
Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. State of Georgia,
235 U. S. 651, 657-8.
The state court unequivocally held that petitioner is
entitled to educational facilities substantially equal to
those afforded white citizens (R. 218), but found as a
fact that the facilities provided by the state for petitioner are substantially equal to those afforded white
students (R. 218-224). This finding of fact is based upon
substantial and uncontradicted evidence (R. 109, 113, 114,
117-118, 157-8, 158-9, 160, 161, 162-3); and it is binding
here.
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota,
236 U. S. 585, 593.
Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278, 281.
Grayson v. Harris, 267 U. S. 352, 357.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389,
393-4.
Waters-Pierce Co. v. Texas Company, 212 U. S.
88, 97.
Willoughby v. Chicago, 235 U. S. 45, 50.
Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S.
560, 567.
Petitioner does not, and truthfully cannot, claim that
this finding of fact by the state court is unsupported by
the evidence.
Petitioner's refusal to avail himself of the educational facilities provided for him by the State of Missouri under the Lincoln University Act (R. 218-219, 222,
74, 82, 83, 84), is an insuperable obstacle to his recovery.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
235 u. s. 151, 163-4.
This case does not fall within Paragraph 5 of Rule 38
of this court, because (a) the state court's decision does
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not involve a substantial federal question; (b) the decision is in accord with applicable decisions of this cottrt
(Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 544; Gong Lum v.
Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 85, 86; Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528; Hall v. DeCuir, ( concurring opinion)
95 U. S. 485, 504-506) ; and ( c) there is no showing of
"special and important reasons" for the issuance of
certiorari.

II.
The State of Missouri has not denied petitioner the
equal protection of the laws by excluding him from the
School of Law of the University of Missouri.
Race separation for purposes of education does not
infringe the rights of either the white or negro race
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 544.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 85-86.
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 504-506 ( concurring
opinion).
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551-552.
Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 310.
Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 Fed. Cases
294, 296.
Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D. C. 50, 31 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 180, 185.
State ex rel. v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198, 209-211.
McMillan v. School Committee, 107 N. C. 609,
12 S. E. 330, 331.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S.
E: 267, 272.
Joh'J'l,son v. Board of Education, 166 N. C. 468, 82
S. E. 832, 834, 835.
Martin v. Board of Education, (W. Va.) 26 S. E.
348, 349.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36, 49-51.
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People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438,
445-447, 455.
People ex rel. Cisco v. School Board, 161 N. Y.
598, 601.
State ex rel. Gumm v. Albritton, 98 Okla. 158, 224
Pac. 511, 513.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13 Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 165.
United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730, 735.
Puitt v. Commissioner, 94 N. C. 709, 718-719.
Social equality is not a legal question, and cannot
be enforced by laws or the judgments of courts.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 551.
State ex rel. Weaver v. Trustees of Ohio State
University, 126 Ohio St. 290, 297.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448.
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551-2.
Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 311-312.
Martin v. Board of Education, (W. Va.) 26 S. E.
348, 349.
Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, 210.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36.

III.
The facilities for legal education provided for petitioner under the Lincoln University Act (Secs. 9616-9624,
R. S. Mo., 1929) are substantially equal to the facilities afforded white students in the School of Law of the
University of Missouri.
In separating the races and in determining the
particular facilities to be used by each race, the state is
allowed a large measure of discretion; and the courts will
not interfere with the exercise of that discretion as unconstitutional, except in case of a very clear and unmistakable disregard of constitutional rights.
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Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U. S. 537, 550.
Cummin g v. Board of Educatio n, 175 U. S. 528~
545.

Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 87.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S.
E. 267, 270.
Ward v. Flood,· 48 Calif. 36, 54-56.
State ex re.l. v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198, 204-5, 211-12.
People ex rel. King v. Gallaghe r, 93 N . Y. 438,
456.

People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y . ) 13 Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-163.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 In.d. 303, 306.

The Lincoln Universi ty Act (Secs. 9616-9624, R. S~
Mo., 1929) provides higher education for the negroes of
Missouri "up to the standard furnished at the State Uni,rersity of Missouri "; and provides that pending the full
•d evelopm ent of Lincoln Universit y, its board of curators
shall arrang.e for the attendan ce of negro residents of
tl1e state at the univer_sity of any adjacent state, to take
any course of study provided for at the State Universit y
of Missouri an,d which is not taught at Lincoln Universit y,
and to pay the full tuition fees for such attendanc e.
Tl1e d·u ty to do these thi11gs is mandato ry.
Lincoln Universi ty v. Hackman , 295 Mo. 118, 124..
State ex rel. Gaines v. C.a nada (R. 219, 221).
Under this act the duty to provide petitione r with
a legal educatio n is upon the curators of Lincoln University, and not upon the curators of the Universi ty of Missouri. It is the dqty of the Lincoln Universi ty curators,
upon petitione r's request, to establish a school of law in
'L incoln Universi ty and to admit petitione r as a student
therein; and, pending the inaugura tion of that school,
and as a temporar y matter, to arrange for his attendanc e
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in one or another of the schools of law already established
in the universities of any one of four adjacent states (all
of which admit negroes), and to pay his tuition fees in
full while he is attending such school.
Substantial equality and not identity of school
facilities is what is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment; and the Lincoln University Act provides
substantially equal facilities for petitioner.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 84, 85-86, 87.
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 552.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438,
452, 448.
State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198,
211.
State ex rel. Weaver v. Trustees of Ohio State
University, 126 Ohio St. 290, 297.
Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 381, 382.
Cory v. Carter_, 48 Ind. 327, 362, 363.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36, 54, 56.
School Dist. v. Hunnicutt, 51 F. (2d) 528.
State ex rel. Gumm v. Albritton, 98 Okla. 158 ..
224 Pac. 511, 513.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S ..
E. 267.
Dameron v. Bayliss, (Ariz.) 126 Pac. 273, 275 ..
Daviess County Board of Educ. v. Johnson, (Ky.)
200 s. w. 313, 315.
State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio Dec ..
129.
State ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13 Abbott's
Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-162, 165.
United States v. Buntin, 10 Ffid. 730, 735-6.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 306.
People ex rel. Cisco v. School Board, 161 N. Y~
598, 48 L. R. A. 113 ..
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Lincoln University is able, financially and otherwise,
to furnish petitioner with the legal education he seeks.
The quality of legal education available to petitioner
in any of the universities of adjacent states equals that
provided in the School of Law in the U11iversity of
Missouri.
Petitioner's living expenses while attending law
school would be the same whether he attended Lincoln
University, the University of Missouri, or any of the
state universities of Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska or Kansas
(R. 220).
The small difference in travel expense incident to
his attendance in any one of the four law schools in
adjacent states is a mere matter of inconvenience, which
must necessarily arise as an incident to any classification
or school system; and furnishes no ground of complaint.
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 552.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438,
451-452.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 84.
Roberts v. City of Boston, (Mass.) 5 Cush. 198,
209-210.
State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 109,
204, 211.
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 360-361.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36, 42, 52-56.
Dameron v. Bayliss, (Ariz.) 126 Pac. 273, 274.
State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio Dec.
129.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13
Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-162, 165.
United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730, 735-6.
Any small difference in travel expense would be
more than overcome by the payment by the state of his
full tuition fees (Sec. 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929; R. 221-222).
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Petitioner has refused to use the school facilities
provided for him by the State of Missouri; and his refusal
is an insuperable obstacle to his recovery.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
235 u. s. 151, 162-164.
The question as to the constitutionality of the statutory provision for out-of-state instruction is, strictly
speaking, not here for review. This because petitioner
never made application to the Lincoln University curators
for the establishment of a law school; and it is impossible to know whether, if he had applied, a law course
would have been immediately established there. Only
if Lincoln University had refused or delayed establishment
of a law school would the question of the constitutionality
of out-of-state instruction arise.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
235 u. s. 151, 162-164.

IV.
The proof offered both by petitioner and by respondents established the fact, and the state Supreme
Court expressly found, that the state had afforded petitioner the equal protection of the laws, even though he
was excluded from the University of Missouri. This
renders immaterial any discussion of the burden of
proof.
The burden of proof did not rest upon respondents,
but upon petitioner; the settled state rule as to this
purely procedural question is that in a mandamus suit
the burden is upon the relator to prove that he has a
clear legal right to the relief sought; and this burden
continues with him throughout.
State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher, 338 Mo.
622.
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State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252.
State ex rel. Burnett v. School District of the
City of J efjerson, 335 Mo. 803, 812-813.
State ex rel. Buckley v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 248.
Ex parte Ashcraft, 193 lVIo. App. 486.
Petitioner's attack upon the credibility of witnesses
is entirely unfair, and in each instance is not supported
by the record.
Apart from that, petitioner is attacking the credibility
of witnesses whom he himself produced, and for whose
credibility he vouched.
Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597.
Cooper v. Armour & Co., 222 Mo. App. 1176.
Choctaw & M. R. Co. v. Newton, (8 C. C. A.)
140 Fed. 225.

V.
Mandamus against respondents was not a proper
remedy, because petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking extraordinary relief; and
this he failed to do.
National Gas Pipe Line Co. of America v. Slattery,
58 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199, 204.
Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 123.
Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461.
Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U. S. 570, 575.
Ex parte Virginia Commissioners, 112 U. S. 177.
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ARGUMENT.

I.
This case does not present a substantial federal question reviewable by this co-u rt.

The Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled against
petitioner upon two principal propositions, neither of
which involves a substantial federal question.
First. The court has held that the laws of Missouri
do not entitle the petitioner to be admitted as a student
in the University of Missouri, and has held that those
laws provide for the separation of the white and negro
races for the purpose of higher education (R. 211-216).
This construction of the laws of Missouri by the highest
court of that state is binding upon this court (Senn v.
Tile Layers' Prot.e.ctive Union, 301 U. S. 468, 477; Midland
Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 300 U. S.
109, 113; Atchison, Top·e ka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California, 283 U. S. 380, 390-1;
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434, 441; Memphis & C. Ry.
Co. v. Pace, 282 U. S. 241, 244; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query,
286 U. S. 472, 480; Roe v. State of Kansas ex rel. Smith,
278 U. S. 191, 193; Ex Parte Worcester County National
Bank, 279 U. S. 347, 359; Brink.e.rhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 680; Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr, 272 U. ·s. 494, 509; Dorchy v. State of
Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 308; Swiss Oil Corporation v.
Shanks, 273 U. S. 407, 411-412; State of Missouri ex rel.
Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 41; Keith v. Johnson, 271
U. S. 1, 8; Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. State of Georgia,
235 U. S. 651, 657-8). Clearly there is no federal question in this part of the state court's decision.
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Second. The Supreme Court of Missouri, holding
that petitioner is entitled to educational facilities substantially equal to those afforded white citizens (R. 218), has
found as a fact that by the facilities for legal education
available to petitioner (through the establishmen t of a
law school in Lincoln University if he should ask for it,
and, pending that, through out-of-state instruction), petitioner was given the opportunity to receive a legal
education equal to that accorded to white students in
the University of Missouri (R. 218-224). That court
further found as a fact that the facilities available to petitioner through out-of-state instruction, pending the
establishmen t of a law school in Lincoln University, were
substantially identical with those offered white students
in the University of Missouri, and would have given
petitioner, as a prospective Missouri lawyer, as sound,
comprehensiv e and valuable a legal education as is offered white students in the University of Missouri (R.
218-224). These findings of fact ( which are not challenged by petitioner) are based upon substantial and uncontradicted evidence showing in much detail the courses
offered, the casebooks used, the character, scope and ·quality of the instruction offered, the relative standing of the
schools of law available to petitioner, in comparison with
the facilities offered in the University of Misso_u ri and
the standing of its school of law (R. 109, 113, 114, 117118, 157-8, 158-9, 160, 161, 162-3).
It is the settled rule of this court that on certiorari
to review a decision of th.e highest court of a state, this
court is bound by the state court's finding as to the facts,
unless the petitioner contends and can show that the finding is without evidence to support it, or unless a conclusion .of law as to a federal right and the finding of fact
are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to
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pass upon the federal question, to analyze the facts
(Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S.
585, 593; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278, 281; Grayson v.
Harris, 267 U. S. -352, 357; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken.,
266 U. S. 389, 393-4; Waters-Pierce Co. v. Texas Company,
212 U. S. 88, 97; Willoug]iby v. Chicago, 235 U. S. 45, 50;
Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 560, 567).
Petitioner makes no claim in l1is petition or brief that the
case at bar falls within either of these two exceptions to
the general rule.
Petitioner at page 11 of his brief cites decisions by
this court holding that where a federal right is denied,
"it is the province of this court to ascertain whether the
conclusion of the state court has adequate -support in the
evidence." That is ·undo1.1btedly true "where a federal
right has been denied as the result of a finding of fact
which it is contended there was no evidence whatever to
support" (Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U. S. 246,
261). But petitioner in the instant case does not, a11d
truthfully cannot, claim that the finding of the state court
is unsupported by th.e evidence; therefore the rule he
invokes has no application.
None of the other cases cited on this question at page
11 of petitioner's brief in any manner contradicts what we
have said above.
So it appears clear that neither of the two parts of
the decision by the Supreme Court of Missouri involves
a federal question reviewable by this court. The first
part of the decision involves merely a construction of state
laws. The second part of the decision, fully recognizing
petitioner's constitutional right to equal facilities for legal
education, finds as a fact that the State has accorded him
equal facilities-which finding of fact, supported as it is by
strong and uncontradicted evidence, is binding upon this
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court. The absence of a substantial federal question is
manifest.
If the state Supreme Court had denied that the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles
petitioner to substantially equal facilities for legal education, a wholly different question would have arisen. It
could then have been argued with reason by petitioner
that a constitutional right or privilege claimed by him
under the equal protection clause had been denied. But
that situation does not exist. The state Supreme Court
held that "there is no question but what negro citizens
and taxpayers of Missouri are entitled to school advantages
st1bstantially equal to those furnished white · citizens of
the state" (R. 218). Affirming this principle without
equivocation, the court found as a fact that petitioner had
been accorded substantially equal opportunity and facilities (R. 218-222).
.
Independently of the fore going, there is an 1nsuperable obstacle to petitioner's recovery, in this: Petitioner concededly refused to avail himself of the educational facilities for a legal education provided for him
by the State of Missouri. Specifically, he refused to
avail himself of his rights under .the Lincoln University
Act (R. 218-219, 222, 74, 82, 83, 84). If he had applied to the Lincoln University curators for a legal
education, it is to be presumed that they would have
given it to him in accordance with their mandatory
duty under the act. His refusal to avail himself of
his legal rights is fatal to his case.
In McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 235 U. S. 151, 163-4, five negroes sued to restrain
the railway companies from making any distinction in
sleeping and dining car service on account of race.
The negroes' right to equal facilities was · conceded
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(pages 161-2), but recovery was denied for reasons
stated by the court as follows (pages 163-4):
"It is not alleged that any one of the complainants has ever traveled on any one of the five
railroads, or has ever requested transportation on
any of them; or that any one of the complainants
has ever requested that accommodations be furnished to him in any sleeping cars, dining cars or
chair cars; or that any of these five companies has
ever notified any one of these complainants that
such accommodations would not be- furnished to
him, when furnished to others, upon reasonable request and payment of the customary charge. Nor
is there anything to show that in case any of these
complainants offers himself as a passenger on any
of these roads and is refused accommodations equal
to those afforded to others on a like journey, he
will not have an adequate remedy at law. The
desire to obtain a sweeping injunction cannot be:
accepted as a substitute for compliance with the,
general rule that the complainant must present
facts sufficient to show that his individual need
requires the remedy for which he asks. The bill
is wholly destitute of any sufficient grounds for
injunction and unless we are to ignore settled principles governing equitable relief, the decree must
be affirmed."*
This case clearly does not fall within Paragraph 5
of Rule 38 of this court, defining the character of rea-sons which will be considered by this court in deter-•
mining whether it will grant certiorari to review state
court decisions. This, because (a) the Missouri Supreme Court's decision does not involve a substantial
federal question; (b) the decision is in accord with
applicable decisions of this court (Pless.y v. Ferguson,.
163 U. S. 537, 544; Gon-g ___Lum v. R.ice, 275 U. S. 78:~
*All italics in quotations are ours.
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85, 86; Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528;
Hall v. DeCuir, ( concurring opinion) 95 U. S. 485, 504506); and (c) there is no showing of "special and important reasons" for the issuance of certiorari.
Petitioner attempts to make a showing of "special
and important reasons" by claiming conflict between
the decision in this case and the decision in Pearson
v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 570, 103 A. L. R.
706. But the claimed conflict does not exist, for reasons clearly pointed out by the Missouri Supreme Court
(R. 222-224).
Petitioner in effect asks this court to write a declaratory judgment for the purpose of "establishing a
standard of conduct" in other states than Missouri.
We cannot understand how the alleged need for the
establishment of a standard of conduct in other states,
where the facts and statutes are not the same, could
afford any "special and important" reason for the issuance of certiorari in this Missouri case.
Petitioner says (page 4 of his Petition for Certiorari) that he "challenged the Lincoln University Act
as a denial of his federal right to equal protection."
This is not true. In his petition for mandamus (R.
2-11) petitioner did not attack the constitutionality of
the Lincoln University Act.
For these reasons we respectfully submit that this
case does not involve a substantial federal question reviewable by this court.

II.
The State of Missouri has not denie·d petitioner the
equal protection of the laws by excluding him from the
School o,f Law of the University of Missouri.
It is, in effect, now conceded by petitioner that the
laws of Missouri do not entitle a negro to admission as a
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student in the Universi ty of Missouri , and that those
laws provide for separatio n of the white and negro races
for the purpose of higher educatio n. The Missouri Supreme Court has so construe d and applied the laws of
that state (R. 211-216) . That construc tion is controlli ng
here (see cases cited under last previous section of this
argumen t).
It must also be conceded by petitione r that separation of the white and negro races for purposes of ed11cation-the exclusion of members of each race from scl1ools
provided for the other race-do es not infringe the rights
of either race guarante ed by the Fourteen th Amendm ent.
In Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U. S. 537, 544, this court in
speaking of race separatio n said:
"Laws permittin g, and even requiring , their
separatio n in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact · do not nece.ssar ily imply the
inferiori ty of either race to the other, and have been~
generally , if not universa lly, recogniz ed as within
the compete ncy of the state legislatu res in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connecte d with the establish ment of
separate schools for · white and colored children,
which has been held to be a valid exercise of the
legislativ .e power even by courts of states where the
political rights of the colored race have been longest
and most earnestly enforced .''
In Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 85-86, this court
said:
"The question here is whether a Chinese citizen
of the United States is denied equal protectio n of
the laws when he is classed among the colored races
and furnishe d facilities for educatio n equal to that
offered to all, whether white, brown, yellow or black.
Were this a new question , it would call for very
full argumen t and consider ation, but we think that
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it is the same question which has been many times
decided to be ivithin the constitutional power of
tlie state legislature to settle without intervention
of the federal courts under tl1e Federal Constitution"
(citing many cases) .
To the same effect see the concurring opinion in Hall
v. DeCuir, 95 D. S. 485, 504-506.
In Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551-552; a leading case, cited with approval by this court in the Plessy
and Gong Lum Cases, siipra, the Missouri Supreme Court
said:
"But it will be said the classification now in

question is one based on color, and so it is; but the
color carries with it natural race p.eculiarities which
furnish the reason for the classification. There are
differences in races, and between individuals of the
same race, not created by human laws, some of which
can never be eradicated. These differences create
different social relations recognized by all wellorganized .governments. If we cast aside chimerical
theories and look to practical results, it seems to us
it must be conceded that separate schools for colored
children is a regulation to their great advantage."

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"The fact th,a t the two races are separated for
the purpose of receiving instruction deprives neither
of any rights. It is but a reasonable regulation of the
exercise of the right. As said in the case just cited,
"Equality and not identity of privileges and rights is
what is guaranteed to the citizen.' Our conclusion is
that the constitution and laws of this ·state providing
for separate schools for colored children are not for.b idden by, or in conflict with, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution; and the courts of
last resort in several states have reached the same
result" ( citing case-s) ..
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To the same effect are the fallowing decisions:

Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 310.
Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 Fed. Cases
294, 296.
Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D. C. 50, 31 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 180, 185.
State ·ex rel. v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198, 209-211.
McMillan v. School Committee, 107 N. C. 609, 12
S. E. 330, 331.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52
S. E. 267, 272.
Johnson v. Board of Education, 166 N. C. 468, 82
S. E. 832, 834, 835.
Martin v. Board of Education, (W. Va.) 26 S. E.
348, 349.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36, 49-51.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438,
445-447, 455.
People ex rel. Cisco v. School Board, 161 N. Y.
598, 601.
State ex rel. Gumm v. Albritton, 98 Okla. 158,
224. Pac. 511, 513.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13 Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 165.
United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730, 735.
Puitt v. Commissione rs, 94 N. C. 709, 718-719.
SOCIAL EQUALITY IS NOT A LEGAL QUESTION.

Petitioner's true attitude is quite clearly shown by
the fact that in a deposition taken before trial he was
asked whether, if a good law school were established at
Lincoln University on a par with the one at the University of Missouri, he would attend it; and on the
advice of counsel he refused to answer this entirely reasonable question (R. 88-89). This leads to the .reasonable
inference that what petitioner really wants is not equal
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educational facilities so much as social equality. This
may be inferred also from petitioner's brief wherein he
advances an argument which, in substance and effect, is
an argument for social equality of the races. With regard to this point it is sufficient to say that it is uniformly
held by the courts in dealing with the question of race
separation, that social equality is not a legal question
and cannot be settled by law or by the judgments of
courts.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 551, this court
said:
"The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal
rights · cannot be secured to the negro except by an
enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot
accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet
upon terms of social equality it must be the result
of natural affinities, mutual appreciation of each
other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals."
In State ex rel. Weaver v. Trustees of Ohio State
University, 126 Ohio St. 290, 297, the court said:
"The relief that the relater seeks in this suit is
such as to compel the respondents to grant her, not
equal school advantages, but the same social intercourse. The purely social relations of our citizens
cannot be enforced by law; nor were they intended
to be regulated by our own laws, or by the state
and federal constitutions" (citing many cases).
To the same effect are the following decisions:

People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438,
448.

Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551-2.
Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 311-312.
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Martin v. Board of Education, (W. Va.) 26 S. E.
348, 349.
Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, 210.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36.
III.
The facilities for legal education available to, petitioner
under the Lincoln University Act (Secs. 9616 to 9624,
R. S. Mo., 1929) are substantially equal to the facilities
afforded white students in the School o,£ Law of the
University of Missouri.

The State of Missouri has set up a complete and exclusive scheme and plan for the higher education of those
qualified negroes who desire it. This plan affords the
petitioner that equal opportunity which the Fourteenth
Amendm,e nt guarantees. In separating the races, and in
determining the particular facilities to be used by the two
races, the state is allowed a large measure ·o f discretion;
and the courts will not interj ere with the exercise of that
discretion as unconstitutional, except in case of a very
clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the
Constitution of the United States.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 550, a statute of
Louisiana requiring separate accommodations on railroad
trains for the white and colored races, and forbidding any
person to occupy a seat in coaches other than the ones
assigned to the race to which he belonged, was held not
in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. In the course
of the opinion this court said:
"So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to
the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there
must necessarily be a large discretion on the part ·of
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the legislatur e. In determin ing 'the question of reasonablen ess it is at liberty to act with reference to the
establish ed usages, customs and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotio n of their
comfort, and the preservat ion of the public peace
and good order."
In Cummin g v. Board of Educatio n, 175 U. S. 528, 545,
this court said:
"We may add that wJ1ile all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation must be shared
by citizens without discrimin ation against any class
on account of tl1.eir race, the education of the people
in schools mai11tained by state taxation is a matter
belongin g to the respectiv e states, and any interj erence on t]ie part of federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the
case of a clear arid unmistak able disregard of rights
secured by the supreme law of the land."
To the same effect is the decision
Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 87.

i11

Gong Lum v.

In Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E .
267, 270, the North Carolina court in dealing with a case
involving race separatio n for education al purposes said:
"This court would be reluctant to declare invalid
an act establish. ing a public school, when it had received the sanction of the people directly and locally
intereste d, unless it was manifest that these principle s
were violated. Much must be left to the good faith,
integrity and judgmen, t of local boards in working
out the difficult problems of providing equal facilities
for each race in the education of all the children of
the state. Local condition s, relative numbers, and
other well-reco gnized factors enter into the problem,
and must be dealt with in a spirit of justice to all
concerne d, and to promote the honor and welfare of
the state."
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In Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36, 54-56, a case dealing
with the question of race separation for purposes of education, the California court applied the principle that a
large discretion is vested in the school authorities, and in
this connection quoted with approval the following language from a Massachuset ts case:
"In the absence of special legislation on this
subject, the law has vested the power in the committee to regulate the system of distribution and
classification ; and when this power is reasonably exercised, without being abused or perverted by colorable pretences, the decision of the committee must
be deemed conclusive."
The same principle is announced in the following
decisions:

State ex rel. v. McCan,n, 21 Ohio 198, 204-5,
211-12.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438,
456.
People ex rel. Dietz V·. Easton, (N. Y.) 13 Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-163.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 306.
THE LINCOLN UNIVERSITY ACT.

The Lincoln University Act of 1921 (Secs. 9616 to
9624, R. S. Mo., 1929) provides higher education for the
negroes of Missouri "up to the standard furnished at the
State University of Missouri." The control of Lincoln
University is vested in a board of curators consisting of
the state superintende nt of instruction and six other
members, at least three of whom shall be negroes. The
Lincoln University curators are required to organize after
the manner of th.e board of curators of the state university, with the same powers, authority, responsibiliti es,
privileges, immunities, liabilities and compensatio n as
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those prescribed for the board of curators of the University of Missouri (Sec. 9621, R. S. Mo., 1929).
Section 9618 provides:
"The board of curators of the Lincoln University
shall be authorized and required to reorganize said
institution so that it shall afford to the negro people
of the state opportunity for training up to the standard furnished at the State University of Missouri
whenever necessary and practicable in their opinion.
To this end the board of curators shall be authorized
to purchase necessary additional land, erect necessary
additional b11ildings, to provide necessary additional
equipment, and to locate, in the County of Cole, the
respective units of the university where, in their
opinion, the various schools will most effectively promote the purposes of this article."
The legislature, realizing that as a practical matter
the full development of Lincoln University could not be
accomplished instantaneous ly, and that in the interim
negro students should be accorded the same opportunity
for higher education as that accorded to white students
at the University of Missouri, provided for this in a practical and eminently fair manner. Section 9622, R. S.
Mo., 1929, provides:

"Pending the full development of the Lincoln
University, the board of curators shall have the
authority to arrange for tl1e attendance of negro
residents of the State of Missouri at the university
of any adjacent state to take any course or to study
any subjects provided for at the State University of
Missouri, and which are not taught at the Lincoln
University and to pay the reasonable tuition fees for
such attendance; provided that whenever the boara
of curators deem it advisable they shall have the
power to open any necessary school or department."
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The duties impose d upon the Lincol n Univer sity
curato rs by the Lincol n Univer sity Act (Secs. 9616 to
9624, R. S. Mo., 1929) have been held by the Missou ri
Suprem e Court to be manda tory, to the end that the
negroe s of the State sl1all have an opport unity for university educat ion equal to that afforde d by t}1e Un.iver sity of Missou ri. In Lincoln , u ,nive_rs~ty v. Hac1crrian11,
295 Mo. 118, 124, the court said:
"By the act in questio n a great educatio1-ial institutio n was organi zed as a univer sity separa te arid
apart from the state univer sity, for the purpos e of
affordi ng the negroe s of our state the means and
faciliti es of higher educat ion. The board of curato rs
was clothed with the powers confer red by statute
on the curato rs of our . state univer sity, and authorize d to purcha se land and erect additio nal buildings, etc. These duties are affecte d with a public
trust. The statute in tliis respec t may be said to be
manda tory in its nature in order that its great beneficen t purpos es may be carried into e:ff ect and tl1e
state realize the benefi ts of extend ing to the negroe s
of our state the educat ion, ciilture and trai·niri.g afforded by the Univer sity of Missou ri."
Under this contro lling ·interp retatio n of the statute ,
reaffir med in the instant case (R. 219, 221), the L.i ncoln
Univer sity board of curato rs are not merely author ized,
but are require d, to reorga nize the i11stitu tion so tl1at
it shall afford opport unity to negroe s equal to that accorded to white studen ts. And, pendin g the full develo1Jment of Lincol n Univer sity, the · Lincol n Univer sity boarct
of curato rs are not merely author ized, but are reqiL.ired,
to arrang e for the attend ance of negro residen ts of the
state at the univer sity of any adjace nt state, to take any
course of study provid ed at the Univer sity of Missou ri
but not at Lincol n Univer sit)r; and they are not merely
author ized, but are require d, to pay tl1e reason able
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tuition fees for such attendance (Sec. 9622, R. S. Mo.,
1929). The duty to do these things is mandatory and peremptory.
At two different places in his brief (pages 2, 12) petitioner says the Lincoln University Act required Lincoln
University to be reor·g anized so that it "might" afford
11egro citizens of the state opportunity for training equal
to that afforded at the University of Missouri. This is
an understatement; the statute uses the more positive
words "shall afford" (Sec. 9618).
From the foregoing statutory provisions two conclusions irresistibly follow:
A complete and exclusive scheme and plan for
the higher education of the negroes of the state has been
formulated, and is in actual operation.
1.

2. The responsibility and duty to carry out this
scheme and plan has been placed by law-not upon these
respondents, the curators of the University of Missouribut upon the curators of Lincoln University.
The petitioner says he wants an education in the
law. He is unquestionably entitled to it. The State of
Missouri has made provision for him to receive such
education, and has plainly marked out the course for
him to pursue in order to get it.. The agency of the state
to whom he should (under the statute) apply is the
agency specifically charged with the mandatory duty to
furnish him what he seeks. It is the agency to whom
the state has entrusted the authority and power, and
upon whom the state has imposed the mandatory duty,
to provide the negroes of the state with higher education. That agency is the board of curators of Lincoln
University. It is not the present respondents, the board
of curators of the University of Missouri.
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Under this statutory scheme and plan, if and when
petitioner pursues his legal rights and makes application to the Lincoln University curators for an education
in the law, it will then become the mandatory duty of
these curators (a) to establish a school of law in Lincoln
University and to admit petitioner as a student therein;
and (b) pending that, and as a temporary matter, to
a,rrange for the attendance of petitioner in one or another of the schools of law already established in the
Universities of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa or Illinois (all
of which admit negroes), and to pay his tuition fees
while he is attending such school.
SUBSTANTIAL EQUALITY AND NOT IDENTITY OF SCHOOL
FACILITIES IS WHAT IS GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

The essential thing petitioner seeks is a legal education. The State of Missouri has provided that he shall
have it. There is provided for him the opportunity, to be
freely had for the asking, to receive through the curators
of Lincoln University an education in the law, equal in
all substantial respects to that provided in the Missouri
University Law School.
Petitioner's whole case is based upon the erroneous
assumption that he is constitutionally entitled to a legal
education at a particular place, or in a particular school.
This assumption is entirely unfounded. The Fourteenth·
Amendment no more gives petitioner the right to attend
the University of Missouri than it gives a white student
the right to attend Lincoln University. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment goes no
further than to require that the facilities for education
afforded each race shall be substantially equal. The
thing required is not that the facilities for negro students
be identical (in the very same sc.h ools and class rooms),
but that they shall be substantially equal to the facilities
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offered to white studen ts. The decisio n in the instant
case clearly recogn izes and applies this princip le (R. 218).
- Petitio ner conten ds (page 18 of Brief) that he is
constit utional ly entitle d to what he is pleased to call the
"diplom a value" of an educat ion in the Univer sity of
Missou ri. It is a naive concep tion of the value of an education, that its worth is to be atteste d by a "diplom a''
from a particu lar place. There is not a scintill a of evidence in this case that a legal educat ion at the Univer sity
of Missou ri has a "diplom a value." The eviden ce in this
case overwh elming ly proves that the opport unity afforde d
to petitio ner to receive a legal educat ion was equal to
that afforde d to studen ts at the Univer sity of Missou ri
(R. 218-224, 99, 100, 109, 113, 114, 117-118, 157-8, 158-9,
160, 161, 162-3).
Even if there were a "diplom a value" in having attended the Univer sity of Missou ri, no particu lar citizen
of Missou ri is entitle d to the right to receive his opportunity for an educat ion at that particu lar place. The
State of Missou ri may make reason able regulat ions as to
the system of educat ion which it shall mainta in for its
citizen s, and separa tion of the races is a reason able incident to this regulat ion. Petitio ner has receive d his college educat ion at Lincol n Univer sity, and he admits that
the opport unity thus afforde d to him was fully as good
as the opport unity afforde d at the Univer sity of Missou ri
(R. 79-80, 80-81). The State of Missou ri will furnish
him a legal educat ion at Lincol n Univer sity if he requests it; and when this equal opport unity has been
provid ed for petitio ner, there is no basis for a claim by
him that this opport unity should have been afforde d to
him at anothe r and differe nt place. The State of Missouri cannot be require d to afford equal opport unity for
an educat ion to each citizen in the particu lar place where
each citizen thinks a tenuou s "diplom a value" exists.
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The decision below ( citing and following Plessy v.
Ferguson , 163 U. S. 537, 544, and Gomg Lum v. Rice,
275 U. S. 78, 84) holds that "equality and not identity
of school advantag es is what the law guarante es to
every citizen, white or black" (R. 217-218) . The court
holds that the statutory provision made for the benefit of petition er-(that he may receive a legal education in a school of law to be establish ed in Lincoln
Universi ty, and, pending that, in one or another of
the schools of law already establish ed in the universities of adjacent states)- gives petitio11e r substantially equal facilities for legal educatio n, and satisfies
the provision s of the equal protectio n clause of the
Fourteen th Amendm ent.
In Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 84, a Chinese
child nine years old, who lived in the Rosedale Consolidated High School District, Bolivar County, Mississippi, was by the school authoriti es refused the right
to attend the school provided for white children in
that district. It was not denied that a school for colored
children located in . another district was open to her.
This court held that the Chinese child was not denied
the equal protectio n of the laws by being classed among
the colored races assigned to such separate school in
the outside district. In tl1at connecti on this court said:
"We must assume then that there are school
districts for colored children in Bolivar County, but
that no colored school is within the limits of the
Rosedale Consolid ated High School Dist~ict. . This
is not inconsist ent with there being, at . a place
outside of that district and in a diff~rent district,
a colored school which the plaintiff, Martha Lum,
may convenie ntly attend. If so, she is not denied,
under the existing school system, the right to attend and enjoy the privilege s of a common school
educatio n in a colored school."
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At pages 85-86 the court said:
"The question here is whether a Chinese citizen
of the United States is denied equal protection of
the laws when he is classed among the colored
races and furnished facilities for education equal
to that offered to all, whether white, brown, yellow or black. Were this a new question, it would
call for very full argument and consideration, but
we think that it is the same question which has
been many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the state legislature to settle
without intervention of the federal courts under
the Federal Constitution."
At page 87 the court said:
"The decision is within the discretion of the
state in regulating its public schools and does not
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi is
affirmed."
We respectfully submit that the Gong Lum case
Petitioner contends (page 11 of
is decisive here.
Brief) that that case leaves the question of equal protection "open for consideration by the court where an
express claim is made that petitioner has been excluded from the only public · institution available, solely
because of race or color." In fact what this court said
was this (page 84):
"Had the petition alleged specifically that there
was no colored school in Martha Lum's neighborhood to which she could conveniently go, a different question would have been presented, and
this, without regard to the state Supreme Court's
construction of the state constitution as limiting
the white schools provided for the education of
children of the white or Caucasian race."

42

If the availability of a colored school in an outside
district afforded substantially equal facilities to a nineyear-old child, we submit that the provision in the
Missouri statute for the establisl1ment of a law school
for petitioner in Lincoln University, and, pending that,
provision for his attendance, with full tuition paid, at
any one of four excellent law schools located in adjacent states, only 174, 299, 319 or 468 miles away from
his home (R. 152), certainly afforded substantially equal
facilities to petitioner, a mature m _a n (R. 57). In the
Gong Lum case the nine-year-old child would have
had to go to and from the school in the outside district every school day, while petitioner would have had
to travel to and from law school (whether at Lincoln
University or out-of-state) only two or three times a
year; so that the inconvenience in the facilities provided for petitioner was actually much less than the
inconvenience in the facilities provided for the nineyear-old Chinese child in the Gong Lum case.
In Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 552, suit was
brought to enjoin the children of Brummell, a negro,
from attending a white school located in the distri'ct
where the negro children resided. Brummell's children
were the only colored children of school age residing in
that district4 There was no colored school in that district.
There was a colored school located in another district,
but it was located at a greater distance from Brummell's
home than was the white school. There was squarely
presented for decision the question as to the constitutionality of the laws of Missouri, which provide for the
education of colored children in separate schools located
in a different district from that in which _the colored
children reside. The court held that these laws do not
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court said:

43

"The fact must be kept in mind, for it lies at
the founda tion of this controv ersy, that the laws of
this state do not exclud e colored childre n from the
pL1blic schools. Such childre n have all the school
advant ages and privile ges that are afforde d white
childre n. The fact that the two races are separa ted
for the purpos e of receivi ng instruc tion deprive s
neithe r of any rights. It is but a reason able regulation of the exercis e of the right. As said in the case
just cited, 'Equal ity and not identit y of privileg es
and rights is ivhat is guaran teed to the citizen. ' Our
conclu sion is that the constit ution and laws of this
state provid ing for separa te schools for colored
childre n are not forbidd en by, or in conflic t with,
the Fourte enth Amend ment of the Federa l Constit ution; and the courts of last resort in several .s tates
have reache d the same result."
In People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, a
colored girl brough t suit in manda mus to compel the
princip al of a white school to admit her as a studen t.
A separa te school was provid ed by the school author ities for colored person s, in accord ance with statuto ry
provisi ons. The colored school was located at a greater
distanc e from the relator 's residen ce than was the white
school; but the court held that this was a mere inciden t
to any classifi cation of pupils, and that it afforde d no
substa ntial ground of compla int. At page 452 of the
opinion the court said:
"It is quite imprac ticable for the authori ties to
take into accoun t and provid e for the gratific ation
of the taste, or even the conven ience of the individ ual
citizen in respec t to the place or conditi ons under
which he shall receive an educati on. In the nature
of things one pupil must always travel further to
reach a fixed place of instruc tion than anothe r, and
so too the residen t of one district is freque ntly required to go furthe r to reach the school establi shed
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in his own district than a school in an adjoining district, but these are inconven iences incident to any
system, and cannot be avoided. It is only when he
can show that he is deprived of some substant ial
~ight which is accorded to other citizens and denied
to him that he can successfu lly claim that his legal
rights have been invaded. "
At page 448 of the opinion the court said:
"When the governm ent, therefore , has secured
to each of its citizens equal rights before the law
and equal opportun ities for improve ment and progress, it has accompli shed the end for which it is
organize d and perfarmed all of the function s respecting social adva11tages with which it is endowed .
The design of the common -school system of this
State is to instruct the citizen, and where, for this
purpose, they have placed within his reach equal
means of acquiring an educatio n with other persons,
they have discharg ed their duty to him and he has
received all that he is entitled to ask of the government with respect to such privilege s."
In State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198,
211, the plaintiff, a colored man, sued in mandam us to
compel the school authoriti es to admit his three children
to the privilege s of a white school, which was the only
public school in subdistri ct No. 9, where plaintiff resided.
The township board had formed a joint district compose d
of Subdistr ict 9 and an adjoining district and establish ed
a school in the joint district for the educatio n of colored
children, which afforded facilities equal to those of the
white school in subdistri ct No. 9. The plaintiff attacked
this arrangem ent as a denial to him and his children of
the equal protectio n of the laws, in violation of the
Fourteen th Amendm ent. The Ohio court refused mandamus, and held:
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''The plaintiff, then, cannot claim that his
privileges are abridged on the ground of inequality
of school advantages for his children. Nor can he
dictate where his children shall be instructed, or .
what teacher shall perform that office, without obtaining privileges not enjoyed by white citizens.
Equality of rights ~oes not involve the n_ecessity of
educating white a·nd colored persons in the same
school, any more than it does that of educating
children of both sexes in the same school, or that
different grades of scholars rnust be kept in the same
school. Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages is not prohibited by
either the state or Federal Constitution, nor would
it contravene the privileges of either. There is, then,
no ground upon which the plaintiff can claim that
his rights tinder the Fourteenth Amendment have
been infringed.''

In State ex rel. Weaver v. Trustees of Ohio State
University, 126 Ohio St. 290, the relator, Doris Weaver,
sued in mandamus to compel the university authorities to
admit her to a certain course in home economics and to
residence in the "home management house" as the same
was usually conducted. The relator was a colored girl
and a senior student in the school of home economics. As
a part of this course the students resided for a certain
period in the "home management house" and carried the
responsibility of homemaking under conditions approximating those of a modern home. The relator was denied
admission to this home management house because "it has
never been th-e policy of the Ohio State University to re. quire students of different races or nationalities to reside
together as part of a single family." The relator was the
only girl of her race who had matriculated and become
qualified to take the course; and by reason thereof the
defendants had prepared quarters for relator, having the
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same facilities as were furnished to students of th.e white
race enrolled for such course of study. The Ohio ·court
held that this arrangement did not infringe relator's constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws, and
constituted no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and in this connection said (1. c. 297):
"The relator has been denied no educational advantages or privileges that are not similarly used and
enjoyed by other students; nor has she been denied
the privilege of taking her degree, should she consent
to occupy available space in the home economics
house. On page 211, in the Ohio case, Garnes v. McCann, supra, the learned judge said, 'Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages is not prohibited by either the state or Federal Constitution, nor would it contravene the privileges of either.' "
In Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 381, 382, the complainant, a Chinese citizen of the United States, brought
suit to compel the school authorities to admit him into a
white school. A statute of California provided separate
schools for Chinese. The question was presented whether
complainant's rights under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment were infringed. The court
said:
"Concerning the authority of the state over matters pertaining to public schools within its limits, and
the validity of legislation of the character of that
under consideration, it is well settled that the state
has the right to provide separate schools for the children of different races, and such action is not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, provided the schools so established make no
discrimination in the educational facilities which they
afford. When the schools are conducted under the
same general rules, and the course of study is the
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same in one school as in the other, it cannot be said
that pupils in either are deprived of the equal protection of the law in the matter of receiving an education."
Other decisions upholding the constitutional ity of
provisions for separate education of the races,_ similar to
those involved in the case at bar, are the following:
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 362, 363.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36, 54, 56.
School Dist. v. Hunnicutt, 51 F. (2d) 528.
State ex rel. Gumm v. Albritton, 98 Okla. 158,
224 Pac. 511, 513.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52
S. E. 267.
Dameron v. Bayliss, (Ariz.) 126 Pac. 273, 275.
Daviess County Board of Educ. v. Johnson, (Ky.)
200 s. w. 313, 315.
State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio Dec.
129.
State ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13 Abbott's
Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-162, 165.
United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730, 735-6.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 306.
People ex rel. Cisco v. School Board, 161 N. Y.
598, 48 L. R. A. 113.
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY'S ABILITY TO FURNISH PETITIONER
A LEGAL EDUCATION.

In his brief petitioner contemptuous ly refers to the
Lincoln University Act as, in effect, mere camouflage not
backed up by anything substantial. The implication is
utterly false. The State of Missouri is a pioneer in the
field of higher education for negroes, and is the only
state in the Union which has established a separate university for negroes on the same basis as the state uni:.
versity for white students (R. 138). The state legisla-
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ture has always given Lincoln University substantially all
the money requested by its board (R. 137), and from
1921 to 1935 appropriated $3,477,153.49, from which
$500,000.00 was eliminated by the decision in Lincoln
University v. Hackmann, 295 Mo. 118, leaving the_ net
balance appropriated in t}iose years $2,977,153.49 (R. 149150). The State of Missouri has dealt generously in providing for the higher education of the negro.
Petitioner says in his brief (page 13) that Lincoln
University has no definite program of expansion. This
is a misleadi11g statement. In fact, the president of its
board testified as follows (R. 130) :
"At the present time we are making a very
careful sur,rey of negro education in Missouri to
determine what Lincoln University should do for its
people, that it is not now doing; and on the basis of
that we shall formulate a definite program of expansion."
Petitioner says in his brief (page 13) that Lincoln
University was facing the prospect of ending up the
biennium with a small deficit. In fact, this was a deficit
of only $3,000.00, not in the fund for general operation,
but in a special building fund, due to unexpected labor
trouble in the erection of a building (R. 135, 136). Petitioner ignores the fact that at the time he applied for
admission in the University of Missouri, the unexpended
balances in the Lincoln University funds aggregated
$311,061.74, a substantial part of which funds were available for operation and general expense (R. 147, and see
Laws Mo., 1935, page 66), and that if petitioner had applied for a legal education under the Lincoln University
Act, the funds were therefore ample· to have covered his .
needs. In speaking of the institution winding up with a
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small deficit at the end of the biennium, relator is
stressing a fact which is immaterial. Many state institutions wind up with small deficits at the end of a
biennial period, yet they continue to function as going concerns nevertheless. Indeed, the United States
Government for seven or eight years past has wound up
each year with a very substantial deficit, yet it is still
a going concern and its bonds command a premium in
the financial markets of the world.
Petitioner argues that Lincoln U11iversity has not so
far included a law department. But there has never been
any demand upon Lincoln University for a legal education by any negro (R. 222, 136-137). The petitioner himself has never made any such demand (R. 222, 218-219,
85-86, 136-137). So there is good reason for not having
established a school of law up to this time. As indicating the good faith of the state and of the Lincoln
University curators, the facts are that prior to the institution of this suit the Lincoln University curators were
making a complete survey of the whole subject of negro
education, on the basis of which a definite program of
expansion was planned (R. 130). The history of the
development of Lincoln University, from a modest beginning to what is now one of the leading negro universities in the nation, is cogent evidence that the State
of Missouri has generously responded to its full responsibility for the higher education of the negro race. The
Lincoln University Act has imposed upon the Lincoln
University curators the mandatory duty to establish a
school of law in Lincoln University when the need for it
exists. In the light of past expansion of the institution
to meet the growing needs of the negro in the field of
higher education, it is to be reasonably presumed that
the state will, in good faith, -continue to fulfill its ob-ligation.
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It ill becomes petitione r to complain of the absence
of a law departm ent in Lincoln Universi ty, when he admits that he never informed anyone connecte d with
Lincoln Universi ty that he ever desired a legal education. When he was advised .o f his right to apply to that
institutio n, he chose to ignore the rights which the State
of Missouri had afforded him, and voluntar ily followed
a course of action which can accompli sh no other result
than merely to delay his legal educatio n (R. 74, 82, 83,
84, 218-219) .
Petitione r in his brief (pages 22-23) in effect argues
that a request that the Lincoln Universi ty curators
furnish him with a legal educatio n would have been a
vain and useless thing. There is nothing in this record
justifyin g any such suggestio n. If on the date when petitioner applied for admissio n into the Universi ty of Missouri petitione r had instead applied to the Lineoln
Universi ty curators, it would have be~n the duty of
those curators (and the law presume s they would have
performe d the duty) to establish a law school in Lincoln
Universi ty, and, pending that, to arrange for petitione r's
attendan ce in the law school of any one of four adjacent
state universit ies which he might select, and to pay his
tuition fees while so attendin g such law school. Moreover, on that very date, as above pointed out, Lincoln
Universi ty had on hand in unexpen ded funds $311,061.74
(R. 147). The undisput ed evidence shows that a law
school in Lincoln Universi ty could be establish ed and
operated , on a level of scholarsh ip and training equal to
that at the Universi ty of Missouri , for a maximu m of
$10,000.00 per year (~- 185-186) . And on the very day
petitione r applied for admissio n in the Universi ty of Missouri there was in the special tuition fund, in charge of
the state superint endent of schools, the addition al sum of
$6,351.18 available for payment of out-of-st ate tuitions
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for negroe s (R. 220-221, 165). These undisp uted facts,
shown by this record, utterly destroy petition er's con ..
tention that a deman d on the Lincoln Univer sity curator s
would have been useless .
Petitio ner argues in his brief (page 23) that no
means were availab le to open a law school in Lincoln
Univer sity. This statem ent is unsupp orted by the r~cord.
Petitio ner ignores the fact that in 1935-a lthoug h it
would cost a maxim um of only $10,000.00 per year to
establi sh and mainta in a law depart ment in Lincoln University (R. 185-18 6)-$21 2,000.0 0 was approp riated for
salaries of execut ive officials, professors and instructors,
etc., and $80,000.00 was approp riated for operation and
genera l expens e of Lincol n Univer sity (Laws Mo., 1935,
page 66). Petitio ner also ignores the fact that at the ,
time he applied for admiss ion as a studen t in the University of Missou ri the unexpe nded balanc e in the former
approp riation was $138,684.63, and the unexpe nded balance in the latter approp riation was $56,433.75 (R. 147).
Obviou sly there was ample money availab le for the expansio n of Lincol n Univer sity by the establi shment of a
law school, if the deman d therefo r had been made by
petitio ner.
This answer s petitio ner's statem ent (page 3 of Brief)
that no approp riation has been made to enable Lincoln
Univer sity to offer profess ional or gradua te courses. The
fact of the matter is that either of the above funds was
availab le for that purpos e, if there ever had been a
deman d for any profess ional or gradua te course by any
negro citizen of the state. The approp riation s for salarie s
of profess ors and instruc tors were genera l in form, and
were availab le for law professors and instruc tors, if
needed (see approp _riation acts copied in append ix).
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The expansion of the teaching staff in Lincoln University is conclusively shown by the steady increase in
the appropriations for salaries. The amounts appropriated for salaries from 1921 to 1935 were as follows (see
appropriation acts copied in appendix):
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1931
1933
1935

$ 80,000.00
124,946.41
154,000.00
175,000.00
180,000.00
200,000.00
200,000.00
212,000.00

That marked expansion has occurred is obvious from
the fact that salary appropriations have nearly tripled
within fourteen years.
At page 13 of his brief petitioner says · that ''no
serious argument was made at the trial that Lincoln
University either could or would inaugurate a law. course
for the benefit of petitioner, the only applicant." This
is a grossly erroneous statement, wholly unsupported by
the record. By respondents' return to the alternative
writ of mandamus they specifically alleged petitioner's
duty to apply to the Lincoln University curators for a
legal education if he desired it, alleged the duty of such
curators to establish a law department in Lincoln University, and the availability of sufficient funds (R. 3639).
While the record does not show the oral arguments
at the trial, petitioner has no basis in fact for his assertion that the same point was not seriously pressed in
argument-the true fact being that it was vigorously
pressed. Petitioner also makes a misstatement when he
refers to himself as "the only applicant" for a law course
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in Lincoln University. The fact is that petitioner refused to become an applicant for such a course at Lincoln
University (R. 218-219, 222, 74, 82, 83, 84).
While it is true, as petitioner says (pages 13-14 of
Brief), that the Lincoln University officials in correspondence with petitioner referred him to the scholarship provisions of the Lincoln University Act (R. 72-73), this
vvas obviously the appropriate thing for the1n to do, in
view of the fact that when petitioner applied for admission to Missouri University (R. 62-63), the opening
of the September semester at Lincoln University was
almost at hand, leaving insufficient time to open a law
school in that institution at that semester. In these
circumstance~ it was the Lincoln University officials' duty
to furnish petitioner out-of-state instruction until a law
school in Lincoln University could be established (Sec.
9622, R. S. Mo., 1929). The fact that they did not
thereafter establish a law school for petitioner was because no one, not even petitioner, ever requested legal
instruction there; and in fact petitioner four days later
definitely indicated his refusal to avail himself of any of
his rights under the Lincoln University Act (R. 65-66,
67). It would have been futile for the curators of Lincoln
University to have established a law school in that institution until at least one student had expressed a desire to receive legal instruction there.
As to money available for the payment of out-ofstate tuitions: The Lincoln University Act provided that
the Lincoln University curators should pay the tuition
fees; and it was this statute which established the right
of relator to full tuition ( Sec. 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929). Under the well-settled law the provisions of this general act,
creating the right to full tuitions, could not be amended
or affected by the terms of the subsequent appropriation
acts (Laws Mo., 1929, p. 61; Laws Mo., 1931, p. 28; Laws
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lV[o., 1933, pp. 9, 87; Laws Mo., 1935, p. 113), the latter
two of which purported to limit payment of tuition fees
to the difference between the amounts respectively
charged out of state and at the University of Missouri
(State ex rel. Davis v. Smith, 335 Mo. 1069; State ex rel.
Hueller v. Thompson, 316 Mo. 272; State ex rel. Tolerton
v. Gordon, 236 Mo. 142). It therefore results, as the
Missouri Supreme Court held (R. 221), that all of the
money appropriated for tuition fees was available for the
payment of full tuitions, in accordance with the provisions of the Lincoln University Act, supra. Petitioner's
statement (page 13 of Brief) that "no money was appropriated for scholarships u11til 1929," is immaterial because petitioner was not ready to take a legal education
until 1935 (R. 57-58).
Petitioner says in his brief (page 14) that only one
negro law student could be found in the adjacent state
universities, and only three negro lawyers had been
admitted to the Missouri bar within the past five yearswhich inferentially suggests that petitioner is now for
the first time contending that there are not enough Missouri negro residents desiring to study law to justify the
expenditure of the money necessary to create a law department at Lincoln University. In making this contention, petitioner overlooks his own contention, vigorously presented below (R. 230), that petitioner's right
to receive a legal education is "individual," and "cannot
be made to depend on how many or how few negroes
apply to the State for a legal education." It is the individual who is entitled to receive the equal protection
of the laws, and if one · qualified negro is denied the
establishment of a law school by the Lincoln University
curators, he may properly claim that his constitutional
privilege has been invaded (McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 160), and by mandamus
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may compel those curators to establish a law school in
that institution (Cumming v. Richmond County Board of
Education, 175 U. S. 528, 545). In this connection the
evidence shows that it would cost a maximum of $10,000.00 per year to maintain and establish such law school
at Lincoln University (R. 185-186), and that the cost to
the state would be equally great if petitioner were admitted as a student in the Missouri University Law School
and taught in a class separately from white students (R.
186).
Petitioner says in his brief (page 13) that the outof-state scholarships have been administered by the state
superintendent of scl1ools and not by the Lincoln University curators. While this is immaterial-petitioner
never having applied to either of these state agencies for
out-of-state tuition-we desire to correct the erroneous
impression created by petitioner's half-true statement.
Section 9622 was enacted in 1921, and required the Lincoln University curators "to pay the reasonable tuition
fees" for the attendance of negro residents at the university of an adjacent state. The duty of the Lincoln
University curators to pay the full tuitions was mandatory (R. 221-222, and see Lincoln University v. Hackmann, 295 Mo. 118, 124). When the General Assembly,
supplementing the appropriations to Lincoln University,
appropriated additio11al sums, aggregating $55,615.91,
specifically for out-of-state tuition fees (Laws Mo., 1929,
p. 61; Laws Mo., 1931, p. 28; Laws Mo., 1933, pp. 9, 87-;
Laws Mo., 1935, p. 113), the state superintendent of
schools assumed the power to administer and disburse
these special funds (R. 167-169). The net result is that
there have been two state agencies charged with or exercising the duty of disbursing out-of-state tuition feesthe Lincoln University curators under Section 9622, and
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the state superintende nt of schools u11der the special
appropriation s acts. The superintende nt of schools, incidentally, is ex officio a member of the Lincoln University
board of curators (Sec. 9617, R. S. Mo., 1929).
Petitioner says (page 13) that the 19~3 appropriatio n
act reduced the scl1olarships from f1..1ll tuition to the differential between the tuition at the out-of-state university
and at the University of Missouri. This contention is
fully answered by the state court's deciston that the proviso limiting out-of-state tuition to the differential vvas
"unconstituti onal and void," and that petitioner was entitled, upon application, to full tuition (R. 221).
QUALITY OF LEGAL EDUCATION AVAILABLE IN THE
UNIVERSITIE S OF ADJACENT STATES EQUALS THAT
IN THE SCHOOL OF LAW IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

Petitioner's own evidence shows that the legal education which petitioner, pending the establishmen t of a
law school in Lincoln University, would receive in the
law school at any one of the four adjacent state ,universities (Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa or Illinois) would be
substantially identical with the education he would receive if admitted into the Law School of Missouri Ur1iversity (R. 219, 117-118). All of those law schools are of
the highest sta11.ding, members of the Association of
American Law Schools, and on the approved list of the
American Bar Association (R. 219, 113) . . ,A student desiring to practice law in Missouri can get as sound, comprehensive and valuable legal education in any one of
these four law schools as he could get in the University of
Missouri Law School. Petitioner's own witness so testifies (R. 219, 117-118); there was no countervailin g testimony and the Missouri Supreme Court so found (R. ·
219).
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The Missouri Supreme Court found as a fact that the
University of Missouri Law School does not specialize in
Missot1ri law and procedure (R. 219). The evidence supporting this finding of fact is fully reviewed in our statement of the case (pages 6-7, supra), and it appears at
pages 99, 100, 109, 111-113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 and
144-145 of the record.
In each of the four adjacent state university - law
schools, as in the University of Missouri Law School,
the system of education is exactly the same, designed
to give the student such fundamental education in the
law as will enable him to practice law in any state
where the Anglo-American system of law obtains (R.
219, 109). In all five schools the same system of instruction is used (R. 219, 109, 113); and the courses
of study and the casebooks used are substantially iden•
tical (R. 219, 155-157, 158-159, 160, 161, 162-163).
Students frequently transfer from one to another of
these five schools, receiving full credit for the work
done - in the former school, and moving right along
without any loss of time (R. 219, 114).
PETITIONER'S LIVING AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.

Petitioner lived in St. Louis, and necessarily would
have had to pay his living expenses, ·whether he attended Lincoln University or the University of Missouri,
Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska or Kansas (R. 220).
The mere fact that in order to avail himself of
legal e·d ucation in any one of the four law schools in
adjacent states, the petition-e r (a grown man) would
b.e put to the necessity of traveling further from his
home in St. Louis than the distance from St. Louis
to Columbia (where the University of Missouri is located),
is a mere matter of inconvenience, which must necessarily arise as an incident to a:oy classification or any
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school system; and the court below held that this furnishes no substantial ground of complaint by petitioner
(R. 220).
In Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 552, the court
said:
"The law does not undertake to establish a
school within a given distance of anyone, white
or black. The inequality in distances to be traveled by the children of different families is but
an incident to any classification , and furnishes no
substantial ground of complaint. People ex rel.
King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438-451."

In People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y.
438, 451-452, the New York court said:
"The fact that by this system of classification
one person is required to go further to reach his
place of instruction than he otherwise would is a
mere incident to any classification of pupils in the
public schools of a large city, and affords no substantial ground of complaint. * * * In the nature of things one pupil must always travel further to reach a fixed place of instruction than
another, and so too the resident of one district is
frequently required to go further to reach the
school established in his own district than a school
in an adjoining district; but these are inconveniences incident to any system, and cannot be
avoided."
To the same effect are the following decisions:

Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 84.
Roberts v. City of Boston, (Mass.) 5 Cush. 198,
209-210.
State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St.
109, 204, 211.
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 360-361.
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Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36, 42, 52-56.
Dameron v. Bayliss, (Ariz.) 126 Pac. 273, 274.
State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio Dec.
129.

People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13 Abbott's
Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-162, 165.
Unitec;l States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730, 735-6.
As a matter of fact, the petitioner's expense of travel
to any of these adjacent state universities would be no
greater than the traveling expense of students living in
various parts of Missouri, who attend the University of
Missouri at Columbia (R. 220, 90, 151-153). It would be
no greater hardship on petitioner, a man now twentyseven years of age, to travel from St. Louis to Champaign, Illinois, for example, than it would be for him to
travel from St. Louis to Columbia, Missouri; or for a
Missouri University student to travel from Caruthersville,
Missouri, to Columbia, Missouri (R. 220, 152).
Even if petitioner's travel expense were slightly increased, this unavoidable disadvantage would be more
than overcome by the fact that the Lincoln University
curators would be required by law to pay the full amount
of his tuition fees (Sec. 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929). These
fees, for the first year of the law course, range in the four
adjacent state universities from $109.75 to $178.00 (R.
220, 157-158, 159-160, 161, 162). In this respect he would
enjoy temporarily a pecuniary advantage over white students attending the University of Missouri, who must pay
tuition fees-which for the first year of the law course
amount to $127.50 (R. 220, 154-155 )-without reimbursement from the State. Petitioner therefore can make no
reasonable complaint based on the fact that, temporarily
and until the establishment of a law department in Lincoln University, he would be required to travel further
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than the distance from St. Louis to Columbia, in order
to avail himself of education in an adjacent state.
PETITIONER REFUSES TO USE THE SCHOOL FACILITIES
PROVIDED FOR HIM BY THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

Although the State has made all reasonable provisions
to afford petitioner the opportunity for legal education
(Secs. 9618 and 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929), the petitioner has
deliberately chosen not to avail himself of these provisions
(R. 218-219). When he applied for admission to the University of Missouri, he was by the registrar referred to
the president of Lincoln University (R. 65), who in turn
wrote petitioner, calling his attention specifically to the
provisions of the Lincoln University Act, and offering him
aid thereunder (R. 72-73). Petitioner admits that he was
thus fully advised of the provisions made for his benefit
by the act, and he says that after full consideration he
deliberately refused to avail himself of such rights (R.
74, 82, 83, 84) . Instead of proceeding in a reasonable
way, to take advantage of the rights provided for him by
the state, we find him within 48 hours in consultation
with the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (R. 82, 84), whose counsel (his present
counsel) advised him to refuse to avail himself of the
rights provided by the Lincoln University Act, and to
"keep on corresponding with Missouri University" (R. 84).
The record shows, and petitioner admits, that he has
never made application to _Lincoln University to give him
what he seeks (R. 218-219, 222, 74, 82, 83, 84, 85-86). He
refuses to apply to the state agency specifically charged
'
with the mandatory duty to give him what he seeks; and
instead attempts to force his way into the University of
Missouri by mandamus. If he had availed himself of
the rights he enjoys under the Lincoln University Act,.
and had seen fit to accept the opportunity offered to him

61
by the State of Missouri in August, 1935, he would by this
time have completed his three-year law course.
Petitioner's refusal to avail himself of his rights under
the Linc;oln University Act is an "insuperable obstacle"
to his recovery (McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Company, 235 U. S. 151, 162-164).
AS TO PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT REGARDING A CONSTITUTIONAL MONEY EQUIVALENT FOR HIS
ALLEGED RIGHT TO BE A STUDENT IN
MISSOURI UNIVERSITY.

Petitioner argues in his brief (page 20) that if there
could be a constitutiona l money equivalent for his alleged right to be a student in the School of Law of the
University of lYrissouri, it would have to be the "per
capita contribution which the state makes to the legal
education of a white student figuring not only current
expenditure but making a pro rata allowance for the
capital investment in land, buildings and equipment as
well-as, for example, the law building, the law library
and other capital items." The fallacy in this argument
is that no student has the right to demand a per capita
expenditure by the state for his education, but his right
ends when the state furnishes him educational facilities
substantially equal to those furnished other citizens by
the state. But even if, by any manner of reasoning,
it could be established that petitioner would be entitled
to receive this per capita expenditure, it would appear
that the educational facilities here provided for his enjoyment not only render him equal per capita expenditure for educational facilities, but in . addition provide
for him the payment of out-of-state tuition fees, an advantage which the state does not accord to students in
the Law School of the University of Missouri.
.P etitioner overlooks the fact, a f.act so well known
that it is a matter of judicial knowledge, that in the
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reciprocaL practice of the different states of the Union
in rendering educational facilities for higher educational
training, they admit to their higher institutions of learning qualified students who may apply from any state.
In other words, the University of Missouri, as this record
shows, receives students from the State of Illinois, while
Illinois University receives students from Missouri. The
evidence sl1ows that the facilities for legal education in
the two states are of equal standing. By this reciprocal
practice of receiving nonresident students, each state, including Missouri, spends sufficient capital to furnish substantially equal educational facilities to the students it
receives. So that if petitioner should enter the Law
School of the University of Illinois it could not truthfully
be said that he was being educated at the expense of
the State of Illinois, because to say this would overlook
the fact that the State of Missouri furnishes like educational facilities to many residents of the State of Illinois.
By this reciprocal practice between the higher institutions of learning of the various states, it so h.a ppens that
a student attei-1ding any one of these recognized institutions of learning receives · equal facilities for legal educa•
tion. And it is by reason of the fact that this reciprocal
practice exists that petitioner would certainly not be
entitled to demand from the State of Missouri, in addition to payment of his tuition fees at Illinois University,.
the added per capita cost of educating white students at
the Law School of the University of Missouri. If peti-·
tionet should enroll as a student in the Law School of
the University of Illinois, and should receive from the·
State of Missouri (as he would) the tuition fees required for admission to that institution, he would receive that which a student at the Law School of the
University of Missouri receives, to-wit, the opportunity
of using substantially equal facilities for receiving a
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sound legal education, and in addition he would also receive that which a resident Missouri student does not
receive when entering the Law School of the University
of Missouri, to-wit, his full tuition. Petitioner cannot
justly ask for more than this.
In his brief petitioner attempts to belittle the provisions made by the State of Missouri for out-of-state
tuitions, and he argues that these constitute no substantial
equivalent for the legal education offered white residents
The State
in the Missouri University Law School.
of Missouri does not merely offer petitioner out-ofstate tuitions; the state offers l1im a legal education
which is a substantial equivalent to the legal education offered white students in the University of Missouri Law School; and so far as tuitions are concerned,
petitioner is actually given a pecuniary advantage over
white students in the University of Missouri, in that
pending the establishment of a school of law at Lincoln University the state pays his full tuition fees in
the adjacent state university-an advantage which
white students. in the University of Missouri do not
.
enJoy.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROVISION FOR O·U T-OF-STATE
INSTRUCTION IS, STRICTLY SPEAKING, NOT
HERE FOR . REVIEW.

The question of the constitutionality of the provision for out-of-state instruction is, strictly speaking,
not presented for review. This for tl1e reason that
petitioner never made any application to Lincoln University curators for the establishment of a law course
in that institution; and, therefore, it is impossible to
know whether the curators of Lincoln University, had
he knocked at the door, would have immediately established a law course there, rendering it unnecessary
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for him to go out-of-state for a legal education. It
would only be in case he had a pp lied there and they
had refused or delayed establishmen t .of a law school
in that institution, that the question of the constitutiona lity
of out-of-state instruction would arise (McCabe v.
Atchison., Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co .., 235 U. S.
151, 163-4).
However, we do not want to be misunderstoo d as
to our position on this point. We are firmly of the
opinion that had petitioner applied for the establishment of a law school at Lincoln University, and the
Lincoln University curators had offered to pay his tuition out-of-state for the short interval of time that
might have elapsed while they were establishing a
law course at Lincoln University, the necessity of his
temporarily attending a law school of an adjacent state
would not in any manner have impinged upon his conAs we have demonstrate d above,
stitutional rights..
the legal education that he would have thus acquired
is equal in all respects to the legal education afforded
at the University of Missouri; and in addition to that
he would have received the financial advantage of free
tuition.
When we consider the modern means of transportation, of interconnect ing state highways, b1,1s lines, railroads, and interurbans, it cannot be said that any condition which might require petitioner (a mature man,
now 27 years old) to attend law school in an adjoining state for a short time, while Lincoln University
was establishing a law course, would deprive him of
It is no different in legal
any constitutiona l right.
significance from the situation mentioned in some of
the cases which we have reviewed, wl1ere colored children have been sent outside their own district, or have .
been sent to a greater distance than they would have

o5
had to go had they attend ed a white school. Unde r
all the autho rities this is nothi ng more than an inconve nienc e, and in no event does it infrin ge the
stude nt's const itutio nal right.
AUTH ORITI ES CITED BY PETIT IONER .

The decisi on in Pears on v. Murra y, 169 Md. 478, 182
Atl. 590, 103 A. L. R. 706, is distin guish able on groun ds
point ed out in the opinio n below (R. 222-224).
The decisi on in Gorig Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 84,
cited by petiti oner, actua lly suppo rts the decisi on below ,
and was quote d and follow ed by the opinio n.
The decisi on in Board of Educa tion v . Board of Educa tion, 264 Ky. 245, 94 S. W. (2d) 687, cited by petiti oner,
does not in any mann er discus s the legal propo sition
under which it is cited, and is not in point on any question invol ved in the instan t case.
Petiti oner cites 20 Minn esota Law Revie w, 673, 674,
in which the write r says that '·prob ably no foreig n law
schoo l would offer traini ng in _the law of a state equal to
that of its state unive rsity. " This sugge stion is comp letely
answ ered by the evide nce in this case, which shows
witho ut contr adicti on that th.e law schoo l in the Unive rsity
of IVIissouri does not specia lize in teach ing Misso uri law,
and that. the basis of instru ction is the gener al comm onlaw system preva iling throu ghout the Unite d States ; and
.a stude nt desiri ng to practi ce in Misso~uri can get as
sound , comp rehen sive and valua ble legal educa tion in
the law schoo ls of Kansa s, Nebra ska, Iowa and Illino is
·11niversities as in the Unive rsity of Misso uri (R. 219, 99.,
10 0, 113, 116, 11 7., 11.8) ~
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IV.
The proof offered both by petitio,n er and by respo·n dents established the fact, and the state Supre·m e Court
expressly found, that the state had afforded petitioner
the equal protection of the laws, even though he was excluded from the U1rive-r sity of Missouri.

Point III in petitioner's brief (pages 21-22) obviously
has not even a remote bearing upon any federal question. In that point petitioner argues that respondents
carried the burden of proof, a purely state question of
procedure; and that officials of the University of Missouri (petitioner's own witnesses, for whose credibility
he vouched) exhibited on the witness stand an "attitude
of evasion and forgetfulness."
It would seem wholly unnecessary to answer such
arguments in a proceeding such as this. This court on
certiorari to review a state court decision is not concerned with local questions of procedure or with the
credibility of witnesses. However, the answers to petitioner's arguments are clearly apparent from the record,
and may be briefly presented.
The burden of proof did not rest upon respondents, but upon petitioner. The settled state rule as to
this purely procedural question is that in a mandamus
suit tl1e burden is upon the relator to prove that he has
a clear legal right to the relief sought; and this burden
continues with the relator throughout (State ex rel.
Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher, 338 Mo. 622; State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252; State ex rel. Burnett v. School
District of the City of Jefferson, 335 Mo. 803, 812-813;
State ex rel. Buckley v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 248; Ex parte
Ashcraft, 193 Mo. App. 486).
Petitioner's discussion of the burden of proof is pointless. The opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court did not
1.
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(as it migh t prope rly have done) place the burde n of
proof upon petiti oner- indee d, the opinio n does not discuss the burde n of proof at all. Howe ver, the opinio n
does fully state the essen tial facts (R. 210, 218-221, 222).
These facts -prov en large ly by evide nce offere d by petitione r himse lf (R. 91, 119, 121, 128)- show that petiti oner
was accor ded an oppor tunity for legal educa tion substanti ally equiv alent to that offere d to white stude nts in
the Unive rsity of Misso uri Schoo l of Law. We respect fully subm it, there fore, that any discus sion of the
quest ion as to wher e the burde n of proof rests is irrele vant
and futile .
2. Petiti oner's critic ism of the Unive rsity of Missouri officials as guilty of "evas ion and forge tfulne ss" is
unfai r, as the recor d cited by petiti oner demo nstrat es
(R. 92-107, 122-123). As an illust ration of the unfai rness
of this critic ism, petiti oner says (page 21 of his Brief )
that Dean Maste rson ''coul d detail . down to the last odd
numb er the Misso uri cases in the caseb ooks used in his
schoo l of law," but he "coul d not recall the policy of the
Misso uri Law Revie w." In point of fact, Dean Maste rson
did not purpo rt to detail the numb er of Misso uri cases
in the caseb ooks; he mere ly identi fied tabula tions which
had been prepa red, show ing this inform ation (R. 110113) . More over, Dean Maste rson, instea d of evadi ng,
. testifi ed frank ly and in full detail regar ding the policy
of the Misso uri Law Revie w (R. 100-106). Petiti oner
unfai rly says that Dean Maste rson testifi ed that he could
not "spea k for the mann er in which his instru ctors conduct their cours es." In point of fact, his testim ony on
this point was as follow s (R. 116): "Q. Woul d you not
say that more atten tion would be paid to Misso uri law
as far as stude nt instru ction is conce rned? I am not
talkin g about instru ctors' resea rch but about instru ction.
Revie wing your own cours e at Harva rd, in your under -
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gradu ate cours e at Harv ard, woul dn't you say that there
was more stude11.t instru ction given to the stude nts of
Misso uri Univ ersity in Misso uri law than was given to
you at Harv ard, in Misso uri law? A. That is not true
in the cours es I teach . I can't speak for absol utely every
instru ctor.' ' Petiti oner critic izes Dean Mast erson b.ecause he testifi ed that he cou~d not testif y offha nd as to
the value of the Univ ersity of Misso uri law librar y. In
fact, his testim ony on this point was as follow s · (R. 191):
"Q. Could you dupli cate the Univ ersity of Misso uri
librar y for fifty thous and dolla rs? A. I could not sayI don't know . Q. What is your best opini on as the dean
of an appro ved law schoo l? A. Well, I think I would
have to have a little time, with a penci l and piece of
paper and 20 or 30 minu tes." Petiti oner' s couns el then
stated that he woul d ask for the answ er after 20 or 30
minu tes; but appar ently he . forgo t to do so, and the
matte r was never refer red to again (R. 191-1 96).
Petiti oner says (page 22 of his Brief ) that respo ndents "coul d produ ce itemi zed figure s as to railro ad distance s and railro ad fares (R. 152), but displa yed unbeliev able unfam iliari ty with the fiscal opera tion of their
own schoo l of law (R. 122-1 23)." The fact is, the railroad distan ces and fares were not testif ied to by any
witne ss, but were stipu lated by couns el (R. 152-1 53).
While witne ss Stanf ord, assist ant secre tary of the Universi ty of Misso uri, was unabl e offha nd to give · from
memo ry the figure s desir ed by petiti oner' s couns el (R.
121-1 23), he later went to the troub le of prepa ring detailed tabul ation s show ing the inform ation , and they
were receiv ed in evide nce (R. 124-1 25). This witne ss
was not requi red to prepa re these tabul ation s, yet he
did so as a matte r of accom moda tion to petiti oner' s
couns el (R. 123).. And now petiti oner' s couns el critic izes

Mr. Stan ford as "unb elie vabl e'' beca use, with out prev ious
noti ce that the info rma tion wou ld be desi red, he coul d
not from mem ory give the com plic ated figu res in the
tabu latio ns.
Who lly apa rt from the gros s unfa irne ss of peti tion er's atta ck on witn esse s Mas ters on and Stan ford , peti tion er is in no posi tion to atta ck thes e witn esse s, beca use
they wer e his own witn esse s and he vou ched for thei r
-cred ibili ty.
Dun n v. Dun nake r, 87 Mo. 597.
Cooper v. Arm our & Co., 222 Mo. App . 1176.
Cho ctaw & M. R. Co. v. New ton, (8 C. C. A.)
140 Fed . 225.

V.
Man dam us agai nst resp ond ents was not a proper
rem edy, beca use peti tion er mus t exha ust his administrat ive rem edie s befo re seek ing extr aord inar y relief; and
this he faile d to do.

It is a gen eral rule , freq uen tly appl ied by this cour t,
that a suit or mus t exha t1st his adm inis trati ve rem edie s
befo re seek ing extr aord inar y relie f (Nat ural Gas Pipe
Line Co. of Ame rica v. Slat tery , 58 Sup . Ct. Rep . 199, 204
and case s cite d).
Peti tion er conc eded ly is enti tled to an opp ortu nity
from the Stat e of Mis sour i to obta in a lega l educ atio n
subs tant ially equ al to that prov ided by the state for othe r
citiz ens of the stat e (R. 218) . The Boa rd of Cur ator s of
Linc oln Uni vers ity is the agen cy of the stat e entr uste d
with the pow er and char g~d with the duty to prov ide for
peti tion er this opp ortu nity (R. 213-215, 219- 222) . Peti tion er was enti tled to dem and from the Boa rd of Cur ator s
of Linc oln Uni vers ity such opp ortu nity ; and if the oppo rtuni ty wer e deni ed him , he was enti tled to dem and from
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the boar d a righ t to be hear d on the reaso ns upon whic h
the boar d deni ed him th.e oppo rtuni ty.
In poin t of fact petit ione r neve r mad e any dem and
upon the Boar d of Cura tors of Linc oln Univ ersit y to provide him with such an oppo rtun ity (R. 218-219, 222) ; and
the boar d has not deni ed him the oppo rtuni ty. Unti l
petit ione r has soug ht to obta in from the Boar d of Cura tors
of Linc oln Univ ersit y an oppo rtun ity for a lega l educ ation subs tanti ally equa l to that prov ided by the state to
othe r citiz ens of the state , and such oppo rtun ity has been
deni ed him, and petit ione r has soug ht a hear ing from the
boar d of the reaso ns upon whic h the boar d deni ed him
such oppo rtuni ty, petit ione r is in no posi tion to appe al to
the cour ts for any reme dy, and certa inly not for man dam us, to com pel the Boar d of Cura tors of Linc oln Univers ity to prov ide him with the oppo rtun ity for legal
educ ation whic h he says he d•e sires , but whic h he has
neve r requ ested from the auth oriti es char ged with the
duty to prov ide it for him. A forti ori, petit ione r coul d not
appe al to the cour ts for man dam us to com pel the Boar d
of Cura tors of the Univ ersit y of Miss ouri to prov ide him
with a legal educ ation whic h he has not requ ested from
the auth oriti es char ged with the duty to prov ide it for
him (Gol dsmi th v. Unit ed State s Boar d of Tax Appe als,
270 U. S. 117, 123; Natu ral Gas Pipe line Co. v. Slatt ery, 58
Sup. Ct. Rep. 199, 204; Port er v. Inv-e stors ' Synd icate , 286
U. S. 461; Pete rsen Baki ng Co. v. Bryan., 290 U. S. 570,
575; Ex pa.rte Virg inia Commissioners., 112 U. S. 177) .
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IN CONCLUSION.
It is respec tfully submit ted that this case was properly decide d by the Suprem e Court of Missou ri; and that
petitio ner's conced ed right to equal faciliti es for education has 11.ot been denied . His refusal to avail himsel f of
those faciliti es strongl y sugges ts that his real purpos e is
to lend his name as litigan t to those interes ted in furthering a movem ent to bring about social equalit y between the white and negro races. As we have pointed
out, this is not a questio n which can be settled by laws
or judicia l decisions.
The State of Missou ri has set up a comple te and exclusive scheme and plan for the higher educat ion of those
negroe s of the state who desire higher educati on. We
submit that the plan is an entirel y just, fair and adequa te
plan, under which any negro residen t of the state may
at the state's expens e receive higher educat ion in any
branch of learnin g, includi ng the law.
The policy of the state respect ing separat ion of the
races for purpos es of educat ion is believe d by the people
of the state to be a wise policy. Experi ence has shown
it to be a wise policy. It has preserv ed order and discipline in the educat ional system . It has resulte d in a
steady advanc e in the. educat ion of each race. It has
been establi shed at an expend iture of million s of dollars .
The petitio ner, in effect, asks this court to undo all
this, and to overth row the system of separa te educat ion
ordain ed by the constit ution, laws and public policy of
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the state. It is respec tfully submi tted that petitio ner
makes no showin g which would justify this revolu tionary disrup tion of the state's educat ional system . We
respec tfully ask that certior ari be denied .
Respec tfully submit ted,
FRED

L.

WILLIA MS,

FRED

L.
T.

ENGLIS H,

NICK

WILLIA M

CAVE,

S.

HOGSET T,

E. MURRA Y,
Counse l for Respon dents.

RALPH
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APPEND IX.
Appropr iation acts by the Missouri General Assembly
in favor of Lincoln Universi ty from 1921 to 1935, inclusive ,
but excludin g $500,000 appro-p riation held unconstit utional in Lincoln Universi ty v. Hackman n, 295 Mo. 118.
(Laws Mo. 1921, page 65). There is hereby appropriated out of the state treasury, chargeab le to the state
revenue fund for Lincoln institute, Jefferson City, the
sum of three hundred twenty-n ine thousand five hundred
($329,500) dollars, as follows:
Salaries _______ ---------------- -------------------------------------------------------$ 80,000
Support ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------ 50,000
2,000
Expense of board ___________________________________ ---------------------------7,500
Burner equipme nt and repairs____________________________________
Repairs -----------------------------------------------------------------------------Land ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

60,000
30,000

New building:
Dormito ry ------------------------------------------------------------------ 100,000
Total ------------------------------------------------------------------------$3 29,500.

(Laws Mo. 1921, page 101). There is hereby appropriate d out of the state treasury, chargeab le to the
state revenue fund, for the payment of deficienc y claim
of the Lincoln institute, on file in the office of the state
auditor, as follows: Missouri penitenti ary electrical service ·rendered $595.56.
(Laws Mo. 1923, page 51).. There is hereby appropriate d out of the state treasury, chargeab le to the
state revenue fund, the sum of eleven tho9-sand nine

hundred forty-six and 41-100 ($11,946.41) dollars, to pay
the deficienc y claims now on file in the state auditor's
office on account of the salaries of the teachers and employees of Lincoln universi ty for the years 1921 and
1922.
(Laws Mo. 1923, page 60). There is hereby reappropriate d out of the state treasury , chargeab le to the
state revenue fund, the su1n of forty-nin e thousand three
hundred thirty and 42-100 ($49,330. 42) dollars, the same
being the balance in the fund appropri ated by the fiftyfirst general assembly for the construc tion of a dormitory at Lincoln universit y, Jefferson City, which is now
under contract and in the course of construc tion; it being the intention of this act to appropri ate, only, such
amount as may be in the state treasury to the credit of
said building fund at the time the act originall y appropriati ng said money shall expire.
(Laws Mo. 1923, page 60). There is hereby appropriate d out of the state treasury , chargeab le to the
state revenue fund, the sum of seventy thousand ($70,000.00) dollars, for the construc tion and equipme nt of a
new heating and power plant and for furnishin g and
equippin g the boys' new dormitor y building at Lincoln
universit y, Jefferson City, Missouri , as follows:

For the construc tion and equipme nt of a new
power and heating plant ___________________.__________________ $50,000.00
For the furnishin g and installing furniture and
equippin g the boys' new dormitor y building____ 15,000.00
Total ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------$ 70,000. 00
(Laws Mo. 1923, page 96). There is hereby appropriate d out of the state treasury , chargeab le to the
state revenue fund for Lincoln universit y, Jefferson
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City, the sum of one hund red seven ty-fou r thous and
seven hund red thirty ($174,730) dollar s, as follow s:
Salar ies --------------------------------------------------------------------------$113, 000
2,000
Expe nse of board__________________________________________________
Repa irs -------------------------------------------- ------ ------ - 10,000
Supp ort --------------------------------------------------------------------- 49,.730

Total ---------------------------------------------------------------------$174, 730.
(Law s Mo. 1925, page 57). There is hereb y appropr iated out of the state treasu ry, charg eable to the
state reven ue fund, the sum of nine hund red and ninet y ...
six dollar s ($996.00) to pay the defici ency claim of
Linco ln unive rsity, on file in the state audito r's office,
on accou nt of suppl ies for the years 1923 and 1924.
(Law s Mo. 1925, page 78). There is hereb y appropr iated out of the state treasu ry, charg eable to the
state reven ue fund, for Linco ln unive rsity, Jeffer son
City, the sum of two hund red twent y-fou r tho.us and
seven hund red dollar s ($224,700.00), as follow s:
Salar ies -------------------------------------------------------------------------$154, 000. 00
Plant and upkee p:
(Serv ice emplo yees; groun ds (hot house ,
gradi ng, lawn tools) ; buildi ngs (academic -chap el enlar geme nt and renov ation, librar y furni ture and books , repair s,
acade mic furnit ure, enlarg ing and equip ping dinin g room and kitchen)________________

10,000.00

Gene ral suppl ies:
(Wate r, gas, light and powe r, fuel, telephone , printi ng, statio nery, and public ations, posta ge and tolls, janito rial supplies) ---------------------------------------------------------------

48,700.00
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Facili ties of instru ction :
and
biolog ical
physi cal,
( Chem ical,
psych ologi cal labor atorie s; music al instrum ents; mach ine shop; carpe ntry; auto
mech anics ; mech anica l and free-h and
drawi ng; print ery; electr ical fittin gs and
plum bing; home econo mics suppl ies and
equip ment; livest ock; implements)------------

10,000.00

Misce llaneo us:
(Cura tors; stude nt labor ; exten sionfield servic e)----------------------------------------------------

r otal

2,000.00

---------- -------------------------------------------------------- --$224, 700. 00.

(Law s Mo. 1927, page 88). There is hereb y appropr iated out of the state treasu ry, charg eable to the
state reven ue fund, for Linco ln unive rsity, Jeffer son
City, the sum .o f two hund red seven ty-eig ht thous and
dollar s ($278,000.00) as follow s:

Salar ies ----------------------------------------------------------------r------$175, 000. 00
Plant and upkee P------~--------------------------------------------- 15,000.00
Gene ral supplies___________________________________________________ _____ 48,700.00
Facili ties of instru ction __________________________________________ 20,000.00
Camp us impro veme nt and repai ring Presi dent's house ___________________________________________________________ _ 9,300.00
Farm impro veme nt.________________________________________________ _ 3,000.00
Libra ry and labor atory equip ment _____________________ _ 5,000.00
Misce llaneo us requi reme nts ___________ ________________________ _ 2,000.00
Total ______________________ ----------------------------------------------$ 278,000 .00.
(Law s Mo. 1929, page 24). There is hereb y appropr iated out of the state treasu ry, charg eable to the
state reven ue fund for Linco ln unive rsity, Jeffer son City,
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the sum of three hundred six thousand five hundred
dollars ($306,500.00) as follows:
Salaries and sup port ________________________________________________ $l 80,000.00
Cur a tors ---------------------------------------------------------------------Student labor-------------------------------------------------------------Dairy barn, tool house, hothouse and enlargement of poultry house _______________________________________ _
Campus improvement and repairing president's house ___________________________________________________________ _
Farm improvement._________________________________________________ _

2,000.00
4,000.00
5,000.00
2,000.00
1,000.00

Repairs on steam line, heating system and
pl um bing ___________________-------------------------------------------6,000.00
Enlargement and remodeling dining room _____ _ 4,000.00
Renova ting two dormitories _________________________________ _ 5,000.00
Furniture for dormitories _____________________________________ _ 3,000.00
Furniture for class rooms _ ____________________________________ _ 3,000.00
Special repairs, roads, walks, campus, etc. _______ _ 4,000.00
Enlargement of training school _________________________ _ 2,000.00
Plant and upkeep ____________________________________________ . ,_______ 10,000.00
General supplies _____________________________________________________
42,500.00
Facilities of instruction _________________________________________ _ 25,000.00
Library and laboratory equipment ____________________ 5,000.00
Public lectures and extension _____________________________ _ 3,000.00
-4_

Total ____________________ ------------------------------------------------$3 06,500.00.
(Laws Mo. 1929, page 61). There is hereby appropriated out of the state treasury chargeable to the
state revenue fund for the years 1929 and 1930 the sum
of fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) doliars to be used in
'
paying the tuition of negro students to some standard
college or university provided said students .a re pursuing
courses in said college or university not offered at Lincoln university and which are being offered at the University of Missouri and also in providing high school
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scholarships to Lincoln university, the amount of said
scholarship to be dete·r mined by the state superintendent of schools, provided said student has completed the
elementary course of study and lives in a district that
does not provide high school facilities for negro children
and does provide high school facilities for white children. The funds provided for in this section shall be
paid out by the state treasurer upon vouchers properly
approved by the state superintende nt of schools and
audited by the state auditor.
(Laws Mo. 1929, page 101). There is hereby appropriated out of the state treasury, chargeable to the
general revenue fund the sum of two hundred and fifty
thousand ($250,000.00) dollars for the construction and
equipment of an educational building at Lincoln university at Jefferson City.
(Laws Mo. 1931, pages 27-28). There is hereby appropriated out of the state treasury, chargeable to the
state revenue fund, * * *

For the use of the state superintende nt of
schools in paying the tuition of negro students who have completed at least two years
of stand·a rd college education to some standard college or university, provided such said
students are not pursuing courses in such
college or university leading to the A.B.
in liberal arts, or the B.S. in education
but are pursuing courses in such college or
university not offered at Lincoln university,
but which are being offered at the university
of Missouri; and, also, in providing high
school scholarships to Lin~oln university or
fully accredited negro high schools in Mis-
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souri, provided said high school students
have complete d the elementa ry course of
study and lives in a district that does not
provide high school facilities .f or negro children but does provide high school facilities
for white children: the amount of such said
scholarsh ips to be determin ed by the state
superinte ndent of schools. The fund provided by this appropri ation shall be paid out
of the state treasury upon vouchers properly
drawn by the state superinte ndent of schools
and audited by the state auditor ________________________$15,000.00.
(Laws Mo,. 1931, pages 41-47). There is hereby appropriate d out of the state treasury, chargeab le to the
state revenue fund, for the payment of salaries, wages,
and per diem of the officers and employee s; for the
original purchase of property ; for the repair and replacement of property ; for operative expenses and other purposes of * * • Lincoln universit y at Jefferson City
and for Lincoln universit y to be used by its board of
curators in the supervisi on and managem ent of the demonstratio n farm and agricultu ral school for the negro
race as now establish ed at Dalton, * * * for the
years 1931 and 1932, the following items and amounts:

A.

Personal Service:

Salaries, . wages and per diem of the president ,
deans, professor s, and other employee s, and
student labor _____________________________________________________________ $200,000
B.

Addition s:

There is hereby appropri ated out of the state
treasury, chargeab le to the general revenue
fund, the unexpen ded balance of $250,000, ap-
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prop riate d by the fifty -fifth Gen eral Asse mbly
for the cons truct ion and equi pme nt of an additio nal build ing at Linc oln univ ersit y in J efferso n City, such unex pend ed bala nce bein g ____ 208,155
Oper ative equi pme nt; laun dry, clean ing and
sanit ation equi pme nt, prod uctio n and construc tion equi pme n t ____________________ ________ _____________ _____ ___ _

6, 00 O

Tota l addi tions _________ _________________________________________________$414 , 155
C.

Repa irs and Repl acem ents:

0
Buil ding s ------------------------------------------------ -------- ---------------- 10,00
Oper ative equi pme nt, inclu ding educ ation al and
recre ation al equi pme nt, ·hot1s ehold , kitch en and
dinin g room equi pme nt ____________________________________________ 18,00 0
Tota l repa irs and repla cem ents ·------------~---------- $28,0 00
D.

Oper ation :

com mun icati on,
inclu ding
expe nse;
Gene ral
prin ting and bind ing, trans port ation of thing s,
and trave l ____________________ _______________________------------------------ --

6,500

Mate rial and supp lies; educ ation al, scien tific
and recre ation al supp lies, grou nds and road ways , mate rial and supp lies, hous ehol d supplies , light , heat , pow er and wate r supp lies,
stati oner y and offic e supp lies ._______________________________

72,00 0

T.o tal oper ation ________________________________________________________ $78,5 00
Tota l Linc oln univ ersit y at Jeffe rson City,
Mo. _·------------------------------------------------------------------- -----$ 520,655.
Ther e is here by appr opriat ed out of the state treas ury, char geab le to the state
reve nue fund the fallo wing sums , or so muc h there of as

(Law s Mo. 1933, page 9).
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may be necess ary for the purpos e of paying the fallowing deficie ncies, reliefs and refund s:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

State Superi ntende nt of Schoo ls-Tuit ion, Negro
$5,615.91
Studen ts
(Laws Mo. 1933, page 87). There is hereby appropria ted out of the state treasur y, charge able to the
genera l ·revenu e fund, for the years 1933 and 1934 the
sum of ten thousa nd dollars ($10,000.00) to be used in
paying the tuition of Negro college studen ts to some
standa rd college or univer sity not located in Missou ri,
provid ed said studen ts have comple ted at least sixty
hours of standa rd college work, are bona fide residen ts of
Missou ri, and are not pursui ng courses in such college
or univer sity leading to the A.B. degree in Libera l Arts
or the B.S. Degree in Educat ion, but are pursuin g
course s in such college or univer sity not offered at Lincoln Univer sity but which are offered at the Univer sity
of Missou ri; provid ed that the total amoun t paid shall
not exceed the differe nce betwee n the registr ation and
inciden tal fees charge d by the Univer sity of Missou ri to
residen t studen ts and the school attende d for similar
courses ; provid ed further , that the amoun t paid shall not
exceed one hundre d dollars ($100.00) per school year of
nine month s for underg raduat e work and one hundre d
fifty dollars ($150.00) per school year of nine months
for gradua te work; provid ed further , that the tuition
for all studen ts attendi ng terms of less than nine months
shall be prorate d on the above basis.
(Laws Mo. 1933, pages 119-13 1). There is hereby
approp riated out of the state treasur y, charge able to the
state revenu e fund, for the payme nt of salaries , wages,
and per diem of the officers and employ ees; for the
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original purchase .o f property; for the repair and replacement of property; for the operative expenses and
other purposes of * * * Lincoln university at Jefferson City, * * * for the years 1933 and 1934, the
following items and amounts:

*
A.

*

*

*

*

*

*

Personal Service:

Salaries of President, Business manager, Deans,
Professors, Instructors, Physician, Libral"ian,
Secretary, Registrar, Assistant Librarian, firemen, farmer, nurse and student labor _______________ $200,000
C.

General and special repairs and operative
equi pment -----------------------------------------------------------------D.

16,000

Operation:

including communicati on,
General expe11se;
printing and binding, transportatio n of things,
travel, educational, scientific and recreational
supplies, farm and garden supplies, grounds
and roadways material and supplies, household
supplies, laundry, cleaning and sanitation supplies, light, heat, power, and water supplies,
medical, surgical and h.o spital supplies, small
tools, miscellaneou s supplies and repairs, stationery and office supplies____________________________________

70,000

Total Lincoln University at Jefferson City,
Mo. --------------------------------------------------------------------$286,000.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Payable out of the "Lincoln University fund," as follows:

A.

Personal Service:

Salaries of President, Business manager, Deans,
Professors, Instructors, Physician, Librarian,
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Secretary, Registrar, Assistant Librarian, firemen, farmer, nurse and student labor _____________$ 16,000
C.

General and special repairs and operative
equi pm en t ---------------------------------------------------------------D.

2,000

Operation:

General expense; including
communication,
printing, and binding, transportation of things,
travel, educational, scientific and recreational
supplies, farm and garden supplies, gro~nds
and roadways material and supplies, household
supplies, laundry, cleaning and sanitation supplies, light, heat, power, and water supplies,
medical, surgical and hospital supplies, small
tools, miscellaneous supplies and repairs, stationery and office supplies___________________________________ 22,000
Total for Lincoln University at Jefferson
City, Missouri, from funds ____________________________ $40,000.
(Laws Mo. 1935, pages 54-67). There is hereby appropriated out of the state treasury, chargeable to the
funds herein designated, for the payment of salaries,
wages and per diem of the officers, teachers and employees; for the original purchase of property; for the
repair and replacement of property; for the operative
expenses and other purposes of * * * Lincoln University at Jefferson City * * * for the years 1935
and 1936, the following items and amounts:
*

*

*

*

*

For Lincoln University, payable out of State revenue
fund, as fallows:
A.
Salaries
deans,

Personal Service:
of President, business
professors, instructors,

manager,
physician,
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librarian, secretary, registrar, assistant librarian, firemen, farmer, nurse, and student
labor ------------------------------------------------------------------------$200, 000. 00
B.

Additions:

Buildings,
building
equipment,
operative
equipment, water supplies and plumbing,
educational and recreational equipment,
laboratory and scientific equipment, furniture and eq ui pmen t ______________________________________________ 100,000.00
C.

Repairs and Replacements:

General and _special repairs and operative
equipment --------------------------------------------------------------- 20,000.00
D.

Operation:

General ·-' expense; including communication,
printing and binding, transportation of
things, travel, educational, scientific, and
recreational supplies, farm and garden supplies, household supplies, laundry, cleaning and sanitation supplies, light, heat,
power, and water supplies, medical, surgical
and hospital supplies, small tools, miscellaneous supplies · and repairs, stationery and
office sup plies__________________________________________________________

80,000.00

Total Lincoln University out of State
revenue fund _ _________________________________________________$400, 0 00. 00.
For Lincoln University, payable out of the Lincoln
University Fund, as follows:
A.

Personal Service:

Salaries of President, business manager, deans,
professors, instructors, physician, librarian,
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secretary , registrar , assistant librarian , firemen, farmer, nurse and student labor ______________ $12,000.00
C.

Repairs and Replacem ents:

General and special repairs and operative
equipme nt ---------------- ---------------- ------------------------ ----- 2,000.00
D.

Operatio n:

General expense; including communi cation,
printing and binding, transport ation of
things, travel, education al, scientific and
recreatio nal supplies, farm and garden supplies, grounds and roadway s material and
supplies, househol d supplies, laundry, cleaning and sanitatio n supplies, light, heat,
power, and water supplies, medical, surgical
and hospital supplies, small tools, miscellaneous supplies and repairs, stationer y and
off ice supplies _____________________ _------------------------------------- 20,200.00
Total for Lincoln Universi ty payable out of
Lincoln Universi ty Fund ____________________________ $34,200 .00.
(Laws Mo. 1935, page 113). Tuition for Negro college students .-There is hereby appropri ated out of the
State Treasury chargeab le to the general revenue fund
for the years 1935 and 1936, the sum of Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000.00) to be used in paying the tuition of
negro college students to some standard college or university not located in Missouri , provided said students
have complete d at least sixty hours of standard college
work, are bona fide residents of Missouri, and are not
pursuing courses in such college or universit y leading
to the A. B. degree in Liberal Arts, or the B. S. degree
in Educatio n, but are pursuing courses in such college
or universit y not offered at Lincoln Universi ty, but which

